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Expectation Damages, the Objective Theory of
Contracts, and the "Hairy Hand" Case: A Proposed
Modification to the Effect of Two Classical Contract
Law Axioms in Cases Involving Contractual
Misunderstandings
Daniel P O'Gorman'
"Now, Mr. Hart, what sort of damages do you think the doctor should
pay?" 2
INTRODUCTION
W HEN established legal doctrine is applied to the facts of 
a case and
the result appears unjust, a modification of or exception to the legal
doctrine should be considered.' A review of the facts of contract law's most
famous "expectation damages" case-Hawkins v. McGee4-shows that the
court's application of established doctrine resulted in an unjust decision.
i Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. JD, cum laude, New York
University, 1993; BA, summa cam laude, University of Central Florida, 1990. I would like to
thank Helen Huntoon of the New Hampshire Superior Court, Coos County; Joan L. Gearin,
Archivist at the National Archives and Records Administration, Northeast Region; Dr. Linda
Upham-Bornstein; M. Susan Sacco; and Eang Ngov for their help during the preparation of
this Article. I would also like to thank Douglas Baird for answering the numerous (and often
lengthy) contracts questions I have had over the past two years and for the advice provided
by Randy Barnett on teaching contract law at the American Association of Law Schools' New
Professor Workshop.
2 JOHN JAY OSBORN, JR., 'ME PAPER CHASE 7 (Whitson Publ'g Co., spec. anniversary ed.
2003) (1971) [hereinafter ThE PAPER CHASE BOOK) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
question is asked by fictional Harvard law professor Charles W. Kingsfield to student James
Hart on the first day of contracts class. Id. The case under discussion was Hawkins v. McGee. Id.
(discussing Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929)).
3 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in ThIE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW
ESSAYS 206, 2 11 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("A doctrine, even if normatively justified, may serve
as a prima facie premise in legal reasoning, but cannot serve as a conclusive premise of legal
reasoning, because all doctrines are always subject to as-yet-unarticulated exceptions based
on social propositions. Such an exception may be made because the social propositions that
support the doctrine do not extend to a new fact-pattern that is within the doctrine's stated
scope. Alternatively, such an exception may be made because a new fact-pattern that is within
the doctrine's stated scope brings into play other social propositions that require the formula-
tion of a special rule for the fact-pattern.").
4 Hawkins, 146 A. 641.
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Accordingly, a modification of or exception to the general rule of contract
damages should be considered, and this Article maintains that such a
modification or exception should in fact be established.
In Hawkins, Dr. Edward McGee allegedly promised George Hawkins
that he would fix his burned hand and given him a one hundred percent
perfect or good hand,' but the operation left him with a hairy hand.6 The
New Hampshire Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Winslow
Branch, held that any promise by McGee to Hawkins had to be interpreted
objectively and not based on what McGee might have intended.' The
court further held that even when the breach of a contract is based on
the promised outcome of a medical operation, the general rule of contract
damages-protecting the so-called expectation interest-applies, just like
any other breach of contract case.' The effect of these two holdings was
that Hawkins was entitled to damages that would put him in the position
he would have been in had McGee kept his alleged promise, with that
promise being interpreted objectively.
Justice Branch's opinion (applying the expectation damages rule and
the objective theory of contracts) was hardly surprising. It was written in
1929 during the era of so-called classical contract law (which believed
certain legal doctrines were "axiomatic," including that contracts should
be "interpreted objectively" and that the remedy for any breach of
contract should be "expectation damages"),9 by a judge trained at Harvard
5 Id. at 643.
6 McGee v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 53 F.2d 953,954 (st Cit. 1931).
7 See Hawkins, 146 A. at 644 ("If the defendant said that he would guarantee a perfect
result and the plaintiff relied upon that promise, any mental reservations which he may have
had are immaterial. The standard by which his conduct is to be judged is not internal but
external." (citations omitted)).
8 See id. ("The rule thus applied is well settled in this state. 'As a general rule, the mea-
sure of the vendee's damages is the difference between the value of the goods as they would
have been if the warranty as to quality had been true, and the actual value at the time of the
sale, including gains prevented and losses sustained, and such other damages as could be
reasonably anticipated by the parties as likely to be caused by the vendor's failure to keep his
agreement, and could not by reasonable care on the part of the vendee have been avoided.'
We, therefore, conclude that the true measure of the plaintiffs damage in the present case
is the difference between the value to him of a perfect hand or a good hand, such as the
jury found the defendant promised him, and the value of his hand in its present condition,
including any incidental consequences fairly within the contemplation of the parties when
they made their contract.") (citations omitted) (quoting Union Bank v. Blanchard, 18 A. 90,
91 (N.H. 1889)). The trial judge had directed the jury to award tort-like damages based on
the damage to the hand and Hawkins's pain and suffering. Id. at 643; see also Christopher W.
Frost, Teaching Important Contracts Concepts: Reconsidering the Reliance Interest, 44 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1361, 1363 (zooo) ("The trial court's charge to the jury called for a tort-like measure of
recovery, permitting the jury to award damages for Hawkins' pain and suffering and for the
damage to the hand." (citation omitted)). The trial court's measure of damages is similar to
protecting the promisee's so-called reliance interest, discussed infra Part I.A.
9 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 2o8.
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Law Schoolo (where the leading classical contract law scholar-Samuel
Williston-taught)."
But as the notion that legal doctrines are axiomatic has been effectively
discredited," the question arises whether the law applied in Hawkins was
correct, at least with respect to its particular facts. My review of the trial
transcript in Hawkins has uncovered that the facts were likely different from
those commonly portrayed, and the case likely involved a misunderstanding
between McGee and Hawkins with respect to what McGee was promising.
This raises the question whether the general rule of basing expectation
damages on an objective interpretation of the breached promise should be
modified in such a situation.
This Article takes the position that such an exception should be created.
Part I of this Article discusses expectation damages, which is the standard
remedy for a breach of contract; and the "objective theory of contracts,"
under which contract terms are interpreted objectively and not based on
the parties' subjective intentions. Part 1I demonstrates that in a situation
in which the parties attach materially different meanings to the terms of a
contract, the appropriate measure of damages for breach should be either
an amount designed to put the injured party in the position he or she would
have been in had the promise been kept, based on the breaching party's
intended meaning of the promise, or an amount to protect the injured
party's reliance interest (whichever is greater). Part III demonstrates that
contrary to popular perception, Hawkins likely involved a misunderstanding
between Hawkins and McGee regarding what had been promised, and the
appropriate remedy, therefore, should have been based on what McGee
thought he had promised (or Hawkins's reliance interest).
I. Two AxioMs oF CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW-EPECTATION DAMAGES AND
THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. Expectation Damages
When a party breaches an enforceable contract, the injured party has
a right to damages.13 There are three interests of the injured party that
contract law can seek to protect by such an award: (1) the injured party's
to For a brief biographical sketch of Oliver Winslow Branch, see Russell Bastedo,
Publications-Descriptions of Portraits of Justices and Others at the New Hampshire Supreme Court
Building Concord, New Hampshire, NH.GOV (1998) (citation omitted), http://www.nh.gov/nhdhr/
publications/justices/branch.htmi.
ii See 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 390 app. (3d ed. 2004) (pro-
viding brief biographical sketch of Williston and noting that he taught at Harvard Law School
from 1890 to 1938).
12 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2oo4 Wis. L. REV. 271, 281.
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346(t) (1981).
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''expectation interest," which is his or her interest in being put in the
position he or she would have been in had the promise been kept;14 (2)
the injured party's "reliance interest," which is his or her interest in being
put in the position he or she would have been in had the promise not been
made;" and (3) the injured party's "restitution interest," which is his or
her interest in having restored any benefit conferred on the other party
as a result of the promise." The traditional remedy for the breach of a
"bargained-for exchange contract"" is an award of damages's designed
14 Id. § 344(a); see, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929) (holding that
when the defendant doctor breached his promise to provide the plaintiff patient with a per-
fect hand, the proper measure of damages was an amount representing the difference in value
between the hand plaintiff was left with after the operation and the promised hand).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(b) (1981); see, e.g., Chi. Coliseum Club v.
Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542, 552-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1932) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to
recover for out-of-pocket expenses incurred prior to the defendant's breach and in reliance
on the contract).
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(c) (1981); see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 E2d 638, 641 (4th Cir 1973) (holding
that plaintiff was entitled to recover the reasonable value of the work it provided to the de-
fendant under the contract). This division of interests (expectation, reliance, and restitution)
was suggested by George Gardner, see George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Princiles of the
Law of Contracts, 46 HARv. L. REV. I, 15-19 (1932), and made famous by Lon Fuller, see L. L.
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. I), 46 YALE L.J.
52, 53-54 (1936). Although Fuller's article was co-authored by William Perdue, Jr., Fuller's
research assistant, I assume that Fuller was the author and originator of its theoretical portions.
See Peter Benson, Introduction to THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw: NEw ESSAYS, supra note 3, at
I n.I (noting that Fuller is considered "to be the writer of the article and certainly of its theo-
retical parts"). Professor Richard Craswell has argued that Fuller's distinction between the
three interests "is not very helpful in understanding contract remedies," but he acknowledges
that Fuller's "article still dominates so much of the modern analysis of remedies for breach,"
and "most analyses of monetary remedies still begin with Fuller and Perdue's distinction
between the expectation, reliance, and restitution interests." Richard Craswell, Against Fuller
and Purdue, 67 U. CI. L. REV. 99, 99-100 (2ooo) (citation omitted).
17 A "contract" is defined by the American Law Institute (ALl) as "a promise or a set
of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
Accordingly, at least based on the ALI's definition, a "contract" is any enforceable promise,
not just a promise that is enforceable because it is supported by consideration. Thus, a prom-
ise that is enforceable because of the promisee's reliance (traditionally called "promissory
estoppel") or because it was given in recognition of a benefit previously received would be a
"contract" under the ALI definition. See id. § 90 (providing that a promise is binding if "the
promisor should reasonably expect [it] to induce action or forbearance on the part of the prom-
isee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance . . . if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise"); id. § 86 (providing that a promise is binding
to the "extent necessary to prevent injustice" if "made in recognition of a benefit previously
received by the promisor from the promisee."). Accordingly, I have used the term "bargained-
for exchange contract" to differentiate a contract that is binding because it is supported by
consideration from contracts that are binding for other reasons.
18 Specific performance will only be ordered if an award of damages would not be "ade-
quate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party." Id. § 359. But see Alan Schwartz,
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to protect the injured party's expectation interest." In other words, the
award is designed to give the injured party the "benefit of the bargain."2 o
Recovery for the failure to keep an enforceable promise "was from the
beginning measured by the value of the promised performance"" and the
connection between contract law and expectation damages was "taken as
canonical for some hundred years."22
The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 27I (1979) (arguing that specific performance
should be routinely available as a remedy for breach of contract).
19 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932) ("Where a right of action for breach ex-
ists, compensatory damages will be given for the net amount of the losses caused and gains
prevented by the defendant's breach, in excess of savings made possible . . . ."); id. § 329
cmt. a ("In awarding compensatory damages, the effort is made to put the injured party in as
good a position as that in which he would have been put by full performance of the contract
.... "); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) ("IT]he injured parry has a right
to damages based on his expectation interest . . ."); id. § 347 cmt. a ("Contract damages are
ordinarily based on the injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the
benefit of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put
him in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed."); id.
§ 344 cmt. a ("Ordinarily, when a court concludes that there has been a breach of contract, it
enforces the broken promise by protecting the expectation that the injured party had when he
made the contract. It does this by attempting to put him in as good a position as he would have
been in had the contract been performed, that is, had there been no breach. The interest pro-
tected in this way is called the'expectation interest."'); RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ,
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 41 (1994) ("Anglo-American law ordinarily awards expecta-
tion damages as the remedy for breach of contract."). But see Robert A. Hillman, ContractLore,
27 J. CORP. L. 505, 512 (2002) ("[E]xpectancy damages virtually never make an injured party
whole, so it would be difficult to maintain that the general rule is that they do except when
an exception applies.").
2o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 344 cmt. a (i98i) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that awarding expectation damages "is sometimes said to give the injured
party the 'benefit of the bargain"').
2 1 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 60.
22 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 18
(1981); see also Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 67 ("[The measure of recovery was, as we
know, from the very beginning the promised price, the expectancy."). A.W.B. Simpson has
asserted that even under English common law in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, "the
principle of compensation as opposed to restitution or recuperation was always grasped," and
"the courts consistently treated the breach of promise as the deceitful wrong, with the result
that the proper measure of damage was a substitute for performance," though juries were
given the discretion to award less "if they thought fit." A.W.B. SIMPsoN, A HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF AssuMPSIT 583, 587 (1975) (citation
omitted). But see PS. ATIYAH, 'E RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 142 (1979) ("[A]
respect in which the eighteenth-century model of contract differed from that of the present
day concerned the nature of the remedy which a plaintiff was given for a breach of contract...
.The notion that a promisee was entitled to have his expectations protected, purely and simply
as such, as a result of a promise and nothing else, was not generally accepted in eighteenth-
century law."); see also id. at 148-49 ("In 1770 the jury still retained a considerable measure
of discretion over the application of legal rules, and judges were not unwilling to connive at,
or even encourage, the doing of substantial justice by juries in many civil (as well as criminal)
cases. In contract matters, this meant, among other things, that the damages were almost en-
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The significance of an award of damages designed to protect the injured
party's expectation interest is that he or she will generally receive a larger
recovery than if provided with an award protecting the reliance or restitution
interests.3 Also, protecting the expectation interest means that a breach of
contract action can be maintained in the absence of reliance by the injured
party or the unjust enrichment of the other party.2 4 Thus, the expectation
interest rule is arguably contract law's "most basic" principle."
Although the reliance interest and the restitution interest are sometimes
protected when a bargained-for exchange contract is breached, the reliance
interest is usually used only when the injured party cannot prove his or her
lost profits with the required certainty.26 Furthermore, it has been argued
that the use of the reliance interest when lost profits cannot be proven with
reasonable certainty is in fact the protection of the expectation interest
with an assumption that the injured party would have at least broken
even had the contract been performed." And efforts by an injured party
tirely at the jury's discretion.").
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (1981).
Although [the reliance interest] may be equal to the expectation
interest, it is ordinarily smaller because it does not include the injured
party's lost profit.
... Although [the restitution interest] may be equal to the expectation
or reliance interest, it is ordinarily smaller because it includes neither
the injured party's lost profit nor that part of his expenditures in reliance
that resulted in no benefit to the other party.
Id. Craswell, supra note 16, at 102 ("[Tlhe expectation measure restores to the nonbreacher
not only everything he gave up in reliance on the contract, but also any net profits he would
have made if the contract had been performed. Thus, the expectation measure should usually
exceed the reliance measure (and also the restitution measure), at least in the typical case in
which the nonbreacher's profits would have been positive." (citation omitted)).
24 SeeW. David Slawson, Why Expectation Damages for Breach of ContractMust Be the Norm:
A Refutation of the Fuller and Perdue "Three Interests" Thesis, 8 1 NEB. L. REV. 839,846(2003) (ar-
guing in favor of expectation damages because it provides a remedy for all breaches, including
breaches when there has been no reliance).
25 Benson, supra note 16, at 2; see also id. at 3 ("[I]t is precisely the availability of the
expectation remedy for breach of a wholly executory contract that is the distinctive hallmark
of contract law.").
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 cmt. a (1981) (noting that the reliance
interest can be used as the measure of damages "if [the plaintiff] cannot prove his profit with
reasonable certainty"); Slawson, supra note 24, at 856 ("Injured parties who cannot prove their
lost profits often use the reliance measure to recover their costs." (citation omitted)).
27 David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137,
1153 (1999). This theory encounters difficulties with cases that refuse to treat pre-contract
expenditures as part of the reliance interest. See Chi. Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App.
542 (Ill. App. Ct. 1932) (holding that expenses incurred prior to entering into the contract
332 [Vol. 99
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to recover based on its reliance interest in the case of a losing contract are
subject to deduction for "any loss that the party in breach can prove with
reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract
been performed."" If the defendant carries this burden, the injured party's
recovery would be the same as a recovery that protects the expectation
interest.29
The restitution interest is usually used only when the contract (from the
injured party's standpoint) turns out to be a losing contract.30 Furthermore,
when the restitution interest is used as the measure of damages in such
a situation, the injured party does not seek to enforce the contract, but
instead sues in quasi-contract.31 Thus, the entire purpose of the remedy
when the injured party seeks to enforce a bargained-for exchange contract
is to protect the party's expectation interest."
Until the 1930s, an award of damages based on the expectation interest
(commonly referred to as "expectation damages" or "expectancy damages")
was simply accepted as the appropriate remedy for the breach of a contract,
and the rationale for protecting the expectation interest went unquestioned.3 3
One of the axioms of classical contract law, which dominated from the mid-
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century,3 4 was "that the measure
of damages for breach of contract is expectation damages," and "no room
[was] allowed for justifying doctrinal propositions on the basis of moral and
policy propositions." 3s
could not be recovered as reliance damages); FARNSWORTH,supra note 11, § 12.I6 (stating that
an award of damages designed to protect the non-breaching party's reliance interest "will
[not] allow a party to recover costs incurred before the contract was made" (citation omitted)).
But see Sec. Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 51 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932)
(permitting the recovery of pre-contract expenditures); Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed, 119721
I Q.B. 6o (Ct. App.) at 64 (Eng.) (also permitting the recovery of pre-contract expenditures).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (1981); see Gregory S. Crespi, Recovering
Pre-Contractual Expenditures as an Element of Reliance Damages, 49 SMU L. REV. 43, Parts III(C),
V(B) (1995).
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 cmt. a (1981).
30 See Slawson, supra note 24, at 853 ("[T]here is one situation in which the restitution
measure provides a larger recovery than the expectation (or reliance) measure would. This
is the case in which a material breach by one party entitles the other to cease performing a
contract on which he is losing money - the 'losing contract' case.").
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 4, intro. note (1981) (noting
that when the non-breaching party seeks a recovery based on his or her restitution interest,
the party "has chosen it as an alternative to the enforcement of the contract between them"
(citation omitted)).
32 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (i98i); see also id. cmt. a.
33 Benson, supra note 16, at 2.
34 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 1, 7 (zoo).
35 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at zo8; see also Craswell, supra note 16, at 132 ("[Eixpectation
damages were the standard remedy of classical contract doctrine . . . ."). The un-theoretical
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Prior to this time, contracts scholars endeavored "to bring order and
internal consistency to the law ofcontract," and " [t]hey simply presuppose[d]
the premise that the expectation remedy is a form of compensation without
exploring its normative basis and they stipulate[d] the existence of a deep
connection between the expectation principle and the basic doctrines of
contract formation without explaining its necessity.1" 6 Samuel Williston, in
his classic 1920 contracts treatise, simply stated that "[i]n fixing the amount
of [contract] damages, the general purpose of the law is, and should be,
to give compensation: that is, to put the plaintiff in as good a position
as he would have been in had the defendant kept his contract."" The
Restatement of Contracts, published in 1932, adopted expectation damages
as the standard remedy (without using the term "expectation damages"),
but provided no support for the rule." The apparent lack of interest in
the expectation damages rule (and its theoretical underpinnings) is
demonstrated by the failure to discuss the issue of expectation damages in
Christopher Columbus Langdell's A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts
nature of the work of classical contracts scholars should not, however, detract from their monu-
mental effort to bring order to the law of contracts. See Benson, supra note 16, at 2 ("Williston's
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts represents the most systematically and carefully worked-
out presentation of the legal point of view that culminates several decades of intensive and
highly sophisticated efforts by such masters of the common law as Pollock, Holmes, Langdell,
Ames, Holdsworth, Salmond, and Leake, to bring order and internal consistency to the law of
contract. These writers, and Williston in particular, were remarkably successful in achieving
this aim." (citation omitted)); see also id. at 2 n.4 ("[T]heir work still represents to date the
most sophisticated and successful effort to present the legal point of view in one integrated
compass."). The culmination of their efforts was the Restatement of Contracts. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, at VII (I981) (noting that "the work was a legendary success, ex-
ercising enormous influence as an authoritative exposition of the subject"); see also GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 59 (1974) ("[Tjhe Restatement of Contracts is not only the
best of the Restatements, it is one of the great legal accomplishments of all time.").
36 Benson, supra note 16, at 2.
37 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (1920). The current version of
Williston on Contracts is not any more illuminating on the theory underlying the protection of
the expectation interest. See 24 SAMUEL WILLIsToN & RICHARD A. LORD, A 'IEATISE ON THE
LAw OF CONTRACTS § 64:2, at 23-24 (4th ed. 2002) ("The theory underlying [the expectation
damages rule] is as simple as it is significant: A promisee enters into a particular contract be-
cause he or she wants a particular outcome and believes that the best possible outcome, under
the circumstances, will be achieved by contracting with this particular promisor. When the
promisor fails to perform as promised, the promisee becomes entitled to damages designed
to compensate him or her for the harm caused by the breach. That harm, in turn, is the loss
suffered by the promisee when the promisor failed to perform his or her promise-in other
words, the value to the promisee of the promise that was broken." (citation omitted)).
38 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932) ("Where a right of action for breach ex-
ists, compensatory damages will be given for the net amount of the losses caused and gains
prevented by the defendant's breach, in excess of savings made possible .... "); id. cmt. a ("In
awarding compensatory damages, the effort is made to put the injured party in as good a posi-
tion as that in which he would have been put by full performance of the contract....").
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(1871),39 his A Summary of the Law of Contracts (1880)," or Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.'s The Common Law (1881).41
But in 1936, Lon Fuller, in his famous Yale Law Journal article titled
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, questioned why the protection of
the expectation interest should be the standard remedy for the breach of a
contract. 42 Because the remedy provided for the breach of a legal duty often
sheds light on the purpose for the law creating the duty, Fuller's question
raised the even more fundamental issue of why the law enforces contractS43
(though Fuller acknowledged that there might be a "divergence of measure
[of damages] and motive" for enforcing a particular promise, particularly
if the adopted measure was "a simpler and more easily administered
measure").'
Fuller argued that damages based on protecting the expectation
interest is a "queer kind of 'compensation"' because it gives the injured
party something he or she never had,45 and it therefore must be a form of
distributive justice with a lesser claim to protection than the reliance and
restitution interests.' Fuller rejected the so-called will theory of contract
law (which was based on the notion that contracts were enforceable
39 C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Legal Classics
Library 1983) (1871).
40 C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (TGC Publishers 2004) (1 880)
[hereinafter LANGDELL, SUMMARY].
41 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., The
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
42 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 53. Fuller's article has been described as a "tower-
ing classic." Craswell, supra note 16, at 99 ("In the history of contract law, and of American
legal thought in general, this article stands as a towering classic."); see also Frost, supra note 8,
at 1361 ("Perhaps no single article in any legal discipline has had the pervasive impact on the
way the law is taught.").
43 See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 53 ("[Ilt is impossible to separate the law of
contract damages from the larger body of motives and policies which constitutes the general
law of contracts.").
44 Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
45 Id. at 53.
46 Id. at 56. "Distributive justice" has been defined as
the principles that guide the distribution of goods or burdens among a
group of recipients. This is in contrast to claims of justice arising from
the correction of dealings between two parties ('corrective justice'), just
punishment of wrong actions ('retribution'), and the proper following of
rules laid down earlier ('formal' or 'legal' justice).
BRIAN H. Bix,A DICTIONARY OF LEGALTHEORY 55 (2004); see also ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS I 18 (J. A. K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books 2004) (1953) ("One kind of particular jus-
tice ... is that which is shown in the distribution of honour or money or such other assets as are
divisible among the members of the community (for in these cases it is possible for one person
to have either an equal or an unequal share with another); and another kind which rectifies the
conditions of a transaction.").
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because the parties had voluntarily assumed the responsibility to perform
as promised)47 as providing the basis for the expectation damages rule:
[The "will theory" of contract law] cannot be regarded as dictating in all
cases a recovery of the expectancy. If a contract represents a kind of private
law, it is a law which usually says nothing at all about what shall be done
when it is violated. A contract is in this respect like an imperfect statute
which provides no penalties, and which leaves it to the courts to find a
way to effectuate its purposes. There would, therefore, be no necessary
contradiction between the will theory and a rule which limited damages to
the reliance interest."
Rather, Fuller speculated that the expectation interest was protected
for several other reasons. First, to compensate for reliance losses, which
Fuller maintained were often "very difficult to prove," if one considered
foregone opportunities for gain (i.e., foregone opportunities to enter into
other contracts) a reliance loss.49 Fuller maintained that most contracts result
in the parties foregoing the opportunity to enter into similarly beneficial
contracts, and thus, when a party breaches, the injured party's reliance loss
usually equals the loss in value of the promised performance (because the
injured party forewent the opportunity to secure similar performance from
a third party)." Fuller concluded that:
This foregoing of other opportunities is involved to some extent in entering
most contracts, and the impossibility of subjecting this type of reliance to
any kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the value of
47 See James W. Fox Jr., The Law of Many Faces: Antebellum Contract Law Background of
Reconstruction-Era Freedom of Contract, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 61, 62 (2007) ("According to
this classical, will theory view, 'contract law' describes the legal rules by which courts would
enforce private agreements as stated by the parties; such agreements were seen as expressing
the will of each party, and by enforcing the agreements courts would foster individual freedom
and autonomy.").
48 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 58.
49 Id. at 6o; see also Craswell, supra note 16, at 103 ("In [Fuller and Perdue's] view, the
strongest argument for awarding expectation damages justifies that remedy as an indirect way
of protecting the reliance interest, when the nonbreacher's reliance losses would be difficult
to prove directly." (citation omitted)); Hillman, supra note 19, at 508 ("[Clontract law's actual
remedial goal may be to protect an injured party from reliance losses, which are often more
difficult to prove than expectancy damages."). Out-of-pocket expenditures, as opposed to
losses based on foregone opportunities, are likely to be easier to prove than expectation dam-
ages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a (198t) ("[Tihere is usually little
difficulty in proving the amount that the injured party has actually spent in reliance on the
contract, even if it is impossible to prove the amount of profit that he would have made.").
Courts generally have not permitted a recovery for lost opportunities as part of the reliance
interest. FARNswoRTH, supra note II, § 12. 1.
50 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 6o; see also RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS
OF LAW 122 (6th ed. 2oo3) ("If the victim 'relied' by forgoing an equally profitable contract,
the two measures merge.").
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the expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such losses."
Fuller noted that this explanation for protecting the expectation interest
"would be most forceful in a hypothetical society in which all values
were available on the market and where all markets were 'perfect' in the
economic sense."5 If such conditions existed, the expectation interest and
the reliance interest would be identical because "[tihe plaintiff's loss in
foregoing to enter another contract would be identical with the expectation
value of the contract he did make."" Fuller recognized, however, that this
argument "loses force to the extent that actual conditions depart from [an
economy where all values are available on the market]."'
Second, Fuller argued that the purpose of awarding expectation damages
instead of reliance damages might be to deter breaches of contract, which
is beneficial because breaches of contract cause reliance losses.ss Fuller
asserted that "[w]hatever tends to discourage breach of contract tends to
prevent the losses occasioned through reliance," and an award ofexpectation
damages, being "a more easily administered measure of recovery than the
reliance interest ... will in practice offer a more effective sanction against
contract breach."56
Third, Fuller contended that in contrast to the negative point of view of
curing and preventing reliance losses, a rationale supporting the protection
of the expectation interest was promoting value-enhancing exchanges
and stimulating economic activity." Protecting the expectation interest
accomplishes this because contractual arrangements are more productive
5 1 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 6o; see also POSNER, supra note 50, at 122
("[Rieliance costs incurred during the executory period are difficult to compute. Having
signed a contract, a party will immediately begin to make plans both for performing the con-
tract and for making whatever adjustments in the rest of his business are necessary to accom-
modate the new obligation. The costs of this planning, and the costs resulting from the change
of plans when he finds out that the contract will not be performed, will be hard to estimate.").
If this is true, it would perhaps be an exception to the general rule that "[contract] [diamages,
[including reliance damages], are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence
permits to be established with reasonable certainty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 352 (1981); see also id. cmt. a ("[T]he requirement applies to damages based on the reliance
as well as the expectation interest . . . ."). It could, however, be argued that the expectation
interest is sufficient evidence of the foregone opportunities such that the certainty require-
ment would not preclude recovery. Fuller's idea that courts use one of the three interests to
cure losses based on another interest has seemingly been applied when courts award damages
based on the defendant's gain from breach as a proxy for the expectation interest. See, e.g.,
Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 693 (Mass. 1977) (Braucher, J.) (awarding
amount equal to defendant's profit from breach).
52 Fuller & Perdue,supra note 16, at 62.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 61.
56 Id. (citation omitted).
57 Id
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when the parties are able to rely on them and take resulting action." A
party who knows that it will be able to recover damages for breach based on
the larger expectation recovery, as opposed to the usually smaller reliance
recovery, will be more likely to rely on the contract." As Fuller stated, "[t]o
encourage reliance we must therefore dispense with its proof." Therefore,
Fuller believed that protecting the expectation interest might have the
effect of "promoting and facilitating reliance on business agreements."'6
Thus, according to Fuller, expectation damages likely were awarded not to
protect the expectation interest, but to protect the reliance interest.62
Theorizing about the proper measure of damages arose again in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. 61 During this time, Patrick Atiyah argued that
protecting the expectation interest could not rank equally with protecting
the restitution or reliance interests,' and Robert Hillman noted that
protecting the expectation interest was somewhat inconsistent with the
objective theory of contract formation and interpretation because the latter
is premised on protecting and encouraging reliance.65 But most scholars
defended the award of expectation damages. Following Fuller's lead,
"[miost analysts explainled] the expectancy approach as the best method of
creating incentives for parties to contract and to rely on their contracts."6
The two leading approaches to contract theory-one emphasizing
the "moral value of autonomy" (a deontological approach derived from
Kantianism and liberalism)67 and the other emphasizing economic
analysis (a consequentialist approach that is in some sense a variation of
utilitarianism)68-also defended the expectation interest as the proper
5 8 Id.
59 Id.
6o Id. at 62.
61 Id. at 61. It has been argued, however, that expectation damages can result in inef-
ficient over-reliance by the promisee. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
EcoNoMics 39 (3d ed. 2003).
62 See Slawson, supra note 24, at 841 ("[Fuller and Perdue] eventually concluded that
although there were no good reasons for protecting the expectation interest, there was a good
reason for using the expectation measure of damages as the norm....") (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
63 Benson, supra note 16, at 4.
64 ATIYAH, supra note 22, at 4.
65 Hillman, supra note 19, at 511-12.
66 Id. at 5o6.
67 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 223; see also Bix, supra note 46, at 51 ("Deontological theo-
ries of morality or ethics focus exclusively, or primarily, on the intrinsic moral status of actions,
as contrasted with theories (such as utilitarianism) that focus on consequences. Deontological
theories often derive from, or are otherwise connected to, the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804)."). "[L]iberalism" is "the belief that it is the aim of politics to preserve individual rights
and to maximize freedom of choice." ThE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 3o6 (lain
McClean & Alistair McMillan eds., 3d ed. 2009). "Kantianism" is discussed infra note 68.
68 See Bix, supra note 46, at 42 ("Contemporary discussions about the philosophi-
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measure of damages. Charles Fried was the principal defender of a contract
theory based on a deontological approach, and he saw the foundations of
contract law as the moral obligation to keep a promise and Kantian-based
notions of individual autonomy.' Fried felt that protecting the expectation
interest was consistent with those bases, stating:
If I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my
promise, it is fair that I should be made to hand over the equivalent of the
promised performance. In contract doctrine this proposition appears as the
expectation measure of damages for breach."o
Law and economics scholars argued that the expectation interest
discourages inefficient breaches." "Setting damages any lower than
expectancy would create an incentive for the promisor to breach even
where the surplus from breaching would be insufficient to make the injured
promisee whole."n
Although expectation damages are the norm, and defended by the
cal foundations of contract law usually divide ... according to whether the analysis should
be approached from traditional moral philosophy or from economic analysis."); id. at 214
("Economic analysis-and its legal analogue, law and economics-can be seen to be ground-
ed on a variation of utilitarianism...."). These two leading theories of contract law thus align
roughly with two of the leading theories of moral philosophy-utilitarianism and Kantianism.
"Utilitarianism is, very generally, the view that the rational choice in morality is always the
choice that will maximize human happiness or well-being." JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 71 (rev. ed. 1990). On the
other hand, "Kantianism, again very generally, is the view that the rational choice in ethics is
always the choice that respects the rights of autonomous persons freely to determine their
own destinies, even if this respect is bought at the cost of a loss of happiness or well-being."
Id.
69 FRIED, supra note 22, at 6; see also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 224 ("Fried's book is
the leading exemplar of an autonomy theory of contracts. ). The other leading autonomy
theory was proposed by Randy Barnett. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
70 FRIED, supra note 22, at l7; see also Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 225 ("One of Fried's
central claims is that the autonomy theory of contract explains the remedy of expectation
damages, which Fried sees as a crucial element that distinguishes contract law from other
branches of law, such as torts. Under autonomy theory, he says, promises should be enforced
'as such'-that is, simply because the promise was made, not because enforcement of promis-
es will enhance social welfare."). Fried's book has been referred to as "[a]rguably the most im-
portant, and certainly the most discussed single work of this first wave of contract theorizing."
Benson, supra note 16, at 5 (citation omitted). The weakness in Professor Fried's argument is,
of course, the objective theory of contract formation and interpretation. Professor Hillman has
stated that "professors have written books and articles revealing that the 'key' to contract law
is promise or consent or something else that requires lots of explaining away of the objective
theory of contract formation and interpretation." Hillman, supra note 19, at 513 n-59.
71 POSNER, supra note 5o, at 12 1.
72 Hillman, supra note 19, at 507 (citation omitted); see also POLINSKY, supra note 61, at
33-36 (discussing efficient-breach theory). Professor Polinsky has argued, however, that ex-
pectation damages can result in inefficient over-reliance by the promisee. Id. at 39.
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leading theories of contract law, it is important to recognize that such
damages "virtually never put the injured party in as good a position as if the
contract were performed."" This is because the law generally precludes
the recovery of certain losses, such as those that the non-breaching
party "could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation;"'
damages that the breaching party "did not have reason to foresee as a
probable result of the breach when the contract was made;"" damages that
cannot be proven with "reasonable certainty;"" "emotional disturbance"
damages;n and attorney's fees incurred enforcing the contract." In fact, the
American Law Institute (ALI) takes the position that a court may limit
damages "if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in
order to avoid disproportionate compensation."" Also, even though black
letter law states that expectation damages are to be determined based on
the injured party's subjective valuation of the lost performance,so "courts
typically compute damages objectively, thereby ignoring a party's special
circumstances .. 8. 1
It is also important to recognize that although an award of expectation
damages is the standard remedy for the breach of a bargained-for exchange
contract, the remedy for the breach of a promise that is enforceable solely
because of the promisee's reliance "may be limited as justice requires.""
Thus, "relief may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or
specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than
by the terms of the promise. "83 Also, a promise that is enforceable solely
because it was made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the
promisor is not binding "to the extent that its value is disproportionate to
the benefit."'
73 Hillman, supra note 19, at 506.
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(I) (1981).
75 Id § 351(0).
76 Id. § 352.
77 Id. § 353.
78 See Hillman, supra note 19, at 507-08.
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1981).
8o See id. § 347 cmt. b (noting that expectation damages should be measured by the loss
in value to the "injured party" and not "some hypothetical reasonable person").
81 Hillman, supra note 19, at 508 (citation omitted). This could be caused by the limita-
tions based on certainty and foreseeability.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
83 Id. § 90(t) cmt. d. The ALI notes that "[ijf it is reliance that is the basis for the en-
forcement of a promise, a court may enforce the promise but limit the promisee to recovery
of his reliance interest." Id. § 344 cmt. c. It has been argued, however, that "even in the situ-
ations for which the contracts restatements have explicitly suggested a flexible approach to
damages, the courts continue to use the expectation measure almost exclusively of the other
two." Slawson, supra note 24, at 842 (citation omitted).
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(2)(b) (1981); see also Mary E. Becker,
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The ALI's acceptance that the remedy for the breach of a binding
promise should in some situations be aligned with the interest that renders
the promise binding was an important one, and one that had previously led
to a debate between Samuel Williston and Frederick Coudert (a New York
attorney) during the drafting of the Restatement."' Williston maintained that if
a promise is enforceable, expectation damages were appropriate regardless
of the basis for enforcing the promise."6 In Williston's view (which appears
similar to Fried's view of the rationale for expectation damages), to say
that a promise is enforceable is to say that the injured party is entitled to
compensation equal to the lost performance." Coudert, in contrast, believed
the remedy should be aligned with the interest supporting enforcement."
The issue went unanswered in the Restatement, but the Restatement (Second)
took the flexible approach discussed above.
Accordingly, whatever the purpose of protecting the expectation
interest might be, that purpose is outweighed, in certain circumstances, by
competing policies." For example, attorney's fees are not awarded to the
prevailing party because we do not want to discourage a party from seeking
to vindicate his or her rights." Damages must be proven with reasonable
certainty out of a concern courts will award "baseless recoveries.""
Unforeseeable damages are not recoverable because of a concern that
persons will be reluctant to enter into contracts if they could face excessive
liability and also to encourage them to disclose special circumstances to the
other party during the negotiation process." Damages can also be limited
in certain situations when "justice requires"93 or when the result would
lead to "disproportionate" compensation.9 4
Promissory Estoppe/Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. i3I, 163 (1987) (concluding that expectation
damages are generally available in promissory estoppel cases); Daniel A. Farber & John H.
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 903, 909-1o (1985) (same); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section
90, 1o YALE L.J. II I, I30-132 (i99i) (same).
85 Proceedings at the Fourth AnnualMeeting April 29 - May i, 1926, 4 A.L.I. PROc. app. at
98-100 (1926).
86 See id. at 99.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See Hillman, supra note 19, at 508.
90 Id. (citation omitted).
91 Id. (citation omitted).
92 Id. (citations omitted); see Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the
Industrialization of the Law, in CONTRACTS STORIES I, 12 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007) (discuss-
ing the excessive liability entrepreneurs faced in the nineteenth century).
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS H 90(I), 351(3) (1981).
94 Id. H§ 86(2)(b), 351(3).
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B. The Objective Theory of Contract Interpretation
Another basic principle of contract law, and an axiom of classical contract
law,95 is that the meaning of an enforceable promise, i.e., the scope of the
contractual obligation, is determined objectively." Contract law "adopts an
external or objective standard for interpreting conduct; it means the external
expression of intention as distinguished from undisclosed intention.""
95 Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 2o8;see also LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 40, at 244 ("As
to the rule that the wills of the contracting parties must concur, it only means that they must
concur in legal contemplation .... In truth, mental acts or acts of the will are not the materials
out of which promises are made ... ."); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 102 (1985) (citation omitted) ("The idea that contractual obliga-
tion has its source in the individual will persisted into the latter part of the nineteenth century,
consistent with the pervasive individualism of that time and the general incorporation into
law of notions of liberal political theory. Late nineteenth-century theorists like Holmes and
Williston, however, began to make clear that the proper measure of contractual obligation was
the formal expression of the will, the will objectified. Obligation should attach, they reasoned,
not according to the subjective intention of the parties, but according to a reasonable interpre-
tation of the parties' language and conduct."). Holmes maintained that
[j]ust as the external standard has come to control criminal liability
and responsibility in tort, so, despite conventional pretentions to the
contrary, it has come to govern the field of contract. Men are held liable
for breach of their contractual undertakings not because there had been
a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties-a true synthesis of
wills-but because words of assurance have been so uttered as to lead
the other party to the bargain reasonably to suppose that the promisor
means business.
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Introduction to HOLMES, supra note 41, at x, xxi; I WILLIsToN,supra note
37, § 21, at 22 (citation omitted) ("In regard to both torts and contracts, the law, not the parties,
fixes the requirements of a legal obligation."); 2 id. § 602, at 1160 ("The only inquiry which is
generally pertinent is the meaning of the language used when judged by the standard adopted
by the law."); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. b (1932) ("The meaning that shall be
given to manifestations of intention is not necessarily that which the party from whom the
manifestation proceeds, expects or understands.").
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(I) (1981) ("A promise is a manifestation of
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made."); id. § 200 cmt. b ("[Tihe meaning of the
words or other conduct of a party is not necessarily the meaning he expects or understands.");
see also Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.) ("A
contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent of the
parties.... If... it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words,
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon them, he would
still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort."), aff'd
sub nom. Ernst v. Mechs.' & Metals Nat'l Bank of N.Y., 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, Nat'l
City Bank of N.Y. v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Hillman, supra note 19, at 5iI ("[Ajctual
intentions and agreements hardly matter in cases that get to court. Instead, courts apply an
objective theory of formation and interpretation, under which courts enforce contracts based
on apparent, not real intentions." (citations omitted)).
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981).
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Thus, when the parties to a contract interpret its terms differently, an
interpretation will be given based on how a reasonable person, acting within
the context of the agreement, would have interpreted the terms." "[T]he
intentions of the parties to a contract . . . are to be ascertained from their
words and conduct rather than their unexpressed intentions.", As stated
by Lawrence Friedman, "[tlhe so-called objective theory of contracts ...
insisted that the law enforce only objective manifestations of agreement
and rejected the notion that the essence of an enforceable contract was
a subjective 'meeting of the minds' of the parties."10 Therefore, unless
the parties attach the same unreasonable meaning to a contract term,101
the term will be interpreted objectively.10 In other words, "the question
of meaning in cases of misunderstanding depends on an inquiry into what
each party knew or had reason to know . . . ."'03
Different theories have been advanced for the origin of the objective
theory of contract formation and interpretation. One theory, advanced by
scholars such as Lawrence Friedman and Morton Horwitz, asserts that the
objective theory originated in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century
to promote the needs of the market economy and laissez-faire economics."
Under this theory, the rationale for the objective theory is to "protect[] a
promisee's reasonable reliance on the promisor's manifestation of intent."10 5
As stated by Judge Easterbrook, "if intent were wholly subjective . .. no
one could know the effect of a commercial transaction until years after the
documents were inked. That would be a devastating blow to business." 06
98 See id. § zo(i) (stating if the parties attach materially different meanings to the con-
tract's key terms, and the different interpretations are equally reasonable, there is no mutual
assent and thus no contract); id. § 20I(2); Hillman, supra note 19, at 511; see, e.g., Frigaliment
Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Friendly, J.)
(holding that the meaning of "'chicken' in a contract was to be determined objectively);
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 377; 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 907-08 (holding that
there was no mutual assent when there was a misunderstanding with respect to the ship that
would deliver the cotton that was being purchased under the contract).
99 Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427,427 (2000).
ioo LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE
STUDY 87 (1965) (citation omitted).
io See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20I(I) (I981) ("Where the parties have
attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in
accordance with that meaning."). Professor Hillman has noted that "[clourts have applied this
rule sparingly, however, because the issue rarely arises." Hillman, supra note 19, at 512 n.5 1.
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
1o3 Id § 201 cmt. b.
io4 See FRIEDMAN, supra note IOO; MORTON J. HORWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-I86o, 196-98 (1977).
io5 Hillman, supra note 19, at 511 (citation omitted).
io6 Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 87o F.2d 423,425 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,
J.).
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Another theory, advanced by Joseph Perillo, "is that objective
approaches have predominated in the common law of contracts since
time immemorial," though "there was a brief but almost inconsequential
flirtation with subjective approaches in the mid-nineteenth century."' In
contrast to the economic thesis, Perillo maintains that "[t]he reason for the
persistence of objective approaches can be found in the legal profession's
distrust of the testimony of parties.""o
II. A PROPOSED RULE FOR MEASURING DAMAGES IN
CASES INVOLVING MISUNDERSTANDING
The effect of these two axioms of classical contract law is that an award
of damages, in a case where the parties interpreted the breaching party's
promise in materially different ways, will put the injured party in the
position he or she would have been in based on an objective interpretation
of the promise. The question presented in this Article is whether there
is sufficient justification for this measure of damages in, such a situation.
This Article maintains that in such situations, the appropriate measure
of damages is expectation damages, but based on the promisor's intended
meaning of the promise, not how a reasonable person would interpret
its meaning. If, however, an award based on the injured party's reliance
interest is greater than an award based on the promisor's intended meaning
of the promise, the reliance interest should be protected.
When deciding whether a particular state-imposed sanction against a
person is advisable, consideration should be given to both deontological
and consequential considerations. Thus, consideration should be given to
(1) whether the person acted wrongfully (including the degree of wrongful
conduct); and (2) whether the sanction will improve society's welfare.1'
Taking into consideration both of these factors, an award of expectation
damages based on the objective theory, when there was a contractual
misunderstanding, is not warranted.
With respect to a deontological approach, if one accepts Fried's
argument that an award of expectation damages is appropriate because it
implements the notion that the enforcement of contracts is premised on
the will of the promisor,110 an award of expectation damages based on an
interpretation of the promisor's promise that differs from the promisor's
intent would be illogical. In such a situation, the promisor has chosen only
to provide the promisee with what the promisor believes he or she has
107 Perillo, supra note 99, at 428.
io8 Id. at 477.
io9 "People want their society to be and look just." ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 158 (1974). Accordingly, to increase the likelihood that a law "be just" or "look just,"
consideration should be given to each of the leading approaches to moral questions.
I1o See FRIED, supra note 22,at 17.
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promised. Any liability at all in such a situation is more akin to liability
based on negligence. Thus, an award protecting the reliance interest would
be more appropriate than an award protecting the expectation interest,
and an award of expectation damages based on the objective theory would
arguably constitute punitive damages, which are usually not awarded for
a breach of contract."' Accordingly, those who follow Fried's "contract
as promise" theory cannot object to a recovery that is less than an award
protecting the expectation interest under an objective theory of contract
formation. In fact, an award based on the promisor's intended meaning of
the promise is fully consistent with the notion of "contract as promise," and
avoids (at least to an extent) the inconsistency between the "contract as
promise" theory and the objective theory of contracts.
The rule proposed by this Article should also not offend law and
economics adherents. Law and economics scholars, who focus on the
consequences of adopting a particular remedy," 2 support the expectation
damages measure because it forces the promisor to internalize the promisee's
losses from failing to receive the performance."' Accordingly, the promisor's
decision whether to breach will be efficient because the promisor will have
an incentive to breach only if non-performance (including providing the
promised performance to a third party) is worth more than performance."'
This is known as the "theory of efficient breach.""' Protecting the
expectation interest might also provide the promisor with the incentive to
take the appropriate amount of precautions to avoid a breach." 6
This analysis, however, is not well suited for a contract involving a
misunderstanding of the promised performance. In such a situation, there
is no reason to believe that the parties have even entered into a "value-
maximizing" exchange."' As Judge Posner has noted, "[t]he 'subjective'
theory of contract, which holds that there must be an actual meeting of
iii See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) ("Punitive damages are not
recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for
which punitive damages are recoverable.").
112 See Craswell, supra note 16, at 107 (noting that economic analysis "asks what
consequences will follow from adopting this remedy or that").
113 POLINSKY, supra note 61, at 35.
14 Id. at 35-36; see John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract,
i J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 282 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures,
and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 285 (1970); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, II BELL J. ECON. 466,470 (1980).
115 See Craswell, supra note 16, at io8 ("This effect-the effect on the incentive to per-
form a contract or to break it-has since become famous as the 'theory of efficient breach."'
(citation omitted)).
116 Id. at 1o9.
117 POSNER,supra note 50, at ioi;seeid. at 103-04 ("Because the parties had a different
understanding of what the contract was, there was no basis for thinking that enforcing the
contract would maximize value . . . .").
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the minds of the contracting parties for an enforceable contract to arise,
thus makes economic sense.""' Accordingly, an exchange involving a
misunderstanding is worth less protection from a utility standpoint than
a contract with no misunderstanding. Law and economics adherents
support the objective theory of contracts not because contracts based on
misunderstanding are value-maximizing, but to deter future communication
failures."9 In fact, as Posner acknowledges, when a party who is at fault
for a contract misunderstanding refuses to perform, the "refusal is more
like a tort than a breach of contract,"' suggesting that reliance damages
would be appropriate. Accordingly, there is no justification from a law and
economics standpoint to award expectation damages based on an objective
interpretation of the breached promise.
In fact, law and economics scholars acknowledge that an award of
expectation damages encourages over-reliance by the promisee."' If the
promisee knows his or her expectation interest will be protected in the
event of a breach, the promisee will have an incentive to incur reliance
expenditures that will result in a large profit if the promisor performs,
without taking into account the chance of a breach. 2 Incurring such
expenditures without taking into account the chance of breach thus
encourages inefficient reliance."' Under the rule proposed in this Article,
the smaller remedy for cases of misunderstanding will not eliminate such
inefficient reliance, but it will reduce it to an extent.
With respect to Fuller's suggestion that an award protecting the
expectation interest might be a proxy to protect the reliance interest, in a
situation where the parties attached materially different meanings to the
breached promise, it is unlikely the injured party would have been able
to have secured a contract (as interpreted by the injured party) at a similar
price. That the promisor misunderstood what was being promised (viewed
objectively) suggests that the price for performance was lower than it would
have been had the promisor intended the promise to be as the injured
party interpreted it. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the expectation interest
and the reliance interest will merge in the case of a misunderstanding.
As Fuller acknowledged, his suggestion that the reliance interest and the
expectation interest will often be the same is strongest "in a hypothetical
society in which all values were available on the market;" 2 4 but, in the case
of a misunderstanding, it is unlikely the same performance at the same
118 Id. at ioi.
i19 Seeid.at io2.
120 Id.
12I See POLINSKY, supra note 61, at 37-39 (arguing that protecting either the expectation
or reliance interest induces inefficient reliance investments by the promisee).
122 Id. at 37-39.
123 Id. at 38-39.
124 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 16, at 62.
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price will be available.
Regarding Fuller's suggestion that an award of expectation damages is
more likely to deter breaches of contract, an award of expectation damages
based on the meaning intended by the promisor will not encourage many
more breaches than under an expectation damages award premised on
the objective theory of contracts. The difficulty faced by a promisor in
convincing a fact finder that he or she intended something other than
what an objective interpretation of the promise would suggest will not
significantly alter the promisor's decision whether to breach. Similarly,
with respect to Fuller's proposition that an award of expectation damages
encourages reliance on contracts, the likelihood of a promisor establishing
a contractual misunderstanding will not be significant enough to alter a
promisee's conduct in deciding whether (and to what extent) to rely on the
contract.
In fact, the rule proposed in this Article will reduce the likelihood of a
breach because it encourages a party to ensure there is no misunderstanding
with respect to the other party's duties under the contract. A promisee who
is aware his or her recovery will be less in the case of a misunderstanding
will have an incentive to make sure that the contract is written in a way that
eliminates any potential misunderstandings with respect to the promisor's
promise. In turn, this will reduce the number of breaches because it will
help eliminate breaches caused solely by the promisor misunderstanding
its contractual duties.
An additional benefit of the proposed rule is that it takes account of the
error rate in litigation. Particularly in those situations in which the judge or
the jury concludes that the parties interpreted a promise differently, there
is a fair chance that the judge or jury has reached the wrong conclusion as
to which interpretation is more reasonable, or whether the injured party
actually held the interpretation claimed by him or her. Accordingly, a rule
that awards expectation damages based on the promisor's intended meaning
of the promise mitigates the harshness of liability in those situations in
which the judge or jury has reached an erroneous conclusion.
The possibility that the objective theory of contracts is based on the
needs of the market economy does not dictate a rejection of the rule
proposed in this Article. The fact that liability would still be based on the
objective theory would encourage parties to rely on contracts. The offered
rule is limited to the issue of damages, and it would be rare that a promisor
could convince a fact finder that he or she intended his or her promise to
mean something that would be an unreasonable interpretation. Accordingly,
the proposed rule would have a negligible effect on the incentive to rely on
contracts.
The argument that the objective theory of contracts is premised on
the legal system's distrust of the testimony of parties raises, however, a
problem for this Article's proposed rule. A detriment to the rule offered by
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this Article is that it might encourage parties to testify that they interpreted
their promises in ways that would not be objectively reasonable. Under
the proposed rule, such evidence could not be excluded on irrelevancy
grounds.'25 Thus, there might be a danger of fact finders being swayed
by perjured testimony. But this concern is not a significant one. Because
such testimony would be relevant only to the issue of damages, and not to
liability, and because the likelihood of a factfinder concluding a promisor
intended an unreasonable meaning will be slight, the incentive to make
such an argument would be limited to cases in which there is substantial
evidence to support the promisor's position.
Accordingly, the proper measure ofdamages when the parties interpreted
the promise in materially different ways is an award designed to protect the
injured party's expectation interest, but based on the promisor's intended
meaning of the promise, not a reasonable interpretation of the promise. If,
however, an award protecting the injured party's reliance interest would be
greater, the reliance interest should be protected. Otherwise, the injured
party would receive no compensation in a situation in which the promisor
performed as he or she intended the promise. This would result in the
adoption of the subjective theory of contracts. Also, because the promisor
has acted negligently, the injured party should at least be entitled to be put
in the position he or she would have been in had the promisor not acted
negligently. Such a recovery is necessary to deter negligent behavior.
III. HAWKINS v. McGEE AS A CASE INVOLVING CONTRACTUAL
MISUNDERSTANDING
Having established that the standard remedy for the breach of a
contract should be modified when the parties attached materially different
meanings to the broken promise, this part of the Article provides the results
of an analysis of the most famous expectation damages case-Hawkins v.
McGee'16-and shows that contrary to popular perception, the case involved
a contractual misunderstanding. Accordingly, although the measure of
damages in Hawkins should have been determined by the expectation
interest, the expectation interest should have been based on Dr. McGee's
intended meaning of his promise.
Law students' and law professors' information about the facts in Hawkins
125 See, e.g., FED. R. Evio. 402 (providing that "[evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible"). Presumably, however, such evidence should be admissible to determine
whether there was a misunderstanding. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20I(I)
(1981) ("Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a
term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."); see also Kabil Dev. Corp.
v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505 (Or. 1977) (holding that it was not erroneous for trial court to admit
testimony regarding subjective belief that a contract had been formed).
126 Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
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v. McGee comes primarily from four sources: (1) Justice Oliver Winslow
Branch's opinion for the New Hampshire Supreme Court;z 7 (2) the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in McGee v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co."' (a subsequent lawsuit by Dr. McGee against his insurance
carrier); (3) Jorie Roberts's 1978 article in the Harvard Law Record about
the case;' 9 and (4) John Jay Obsorn, Jr.'s use of the case in the opening
scene of his 1971 novel The Paper Chase,'30 as well as the use of the case in
the opening scenes of the movie'3' and the pilot in the television series.' 32
But based on my review of the trial transcript, the story that emerges from
these sources is misleading in several respects, including the condition of
George Hawkins's hand prior to the operation, whether he and his father
wanted the operation, and whether the operation was in any sense a success.
The likely truth with respect to each of these aspects reveals that the case
involved a misunderstanding between the parties, which is much different
from how the facts of the case are usually portrayed.
A. The Traditional Story
The traditional story is that Dr. Edward R. B. McGee, a general
practitioner in Berlin, New Hampshire,' learns of young George Hawkins's
scarred hand before Dr. McGee served as a doctor in Europe in World War
I.' While in Europe during the war he observes skin grafting operations
on German soldiers,'35 and after returning from the war requests permission
127 Id. at 642.
128 McGee v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 53 Ead 953 (ist Cir. 1931).
129 Jorie Roberts, Hawkins Case:A Hair-RaisingExperience, HARv. L. REC., Mar. I7, 1978,
at I.
130 TIE PAPER CHASE BOOK, supra note 2, at 6-9.
131 TYIE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973) [hereinafter THE PAPER CHASE
MOVIE].
132 The Paper Chase (CBS television broadcast Sept. 9, 1978) [hereinafter The Paper Chase
Television Series]. The case is included in several Contracts casebooks. JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL.,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 2 (9th ed. 2oo8); RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
DOCTRINE 63 (4th ed. 2oo8); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW
19o (8th ed. 2006). The latter two include as a squib case the decision in AlcGee v. UnitedStates
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 53 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1931), and an excerpt from Jorie Roberts's article.
Barnett, supra, at 66-70; Fuller, supra, at 193-97. The case is included in these casebooks to
demonstrate that the primary purpose of contract damages is to protect the non-breaching
party's expectation interest. The first casebook to use the case was apparently Lon Fuller's
1947 casebook. See Frost, supra note 8, at 1361 (noting that the use of Hawkins v. AlcGee "traces
its lineage back to the first edition of Fuller's influential casebook" (citation omitted)).
133 For a background of Berlin, New Hampshire, see Linda Upham-Bornstein, Citizens
with a "Just Cause": The New Hampshire Farmer-Labor Party in Depression-era Berlin, 62 HIsT.
N.H. 117, 118-21 (2oo8).
134 Roberts, supra note 129, at 7.
135 Id.
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from Charles Hawkins (George's father) to perform an operation on George1 6
because he wants to experiment with skin grafting."' Charles and George
are pursued by Dr. McGee for three years,"' even though George does
not need the operation because his scar is just a "small pencil-size scar""'
that "dloes] not substantially affect his use of the hand,"'" and in fact his
hand "[is a practical, useful hand"'41 (he even won several medals for his
marksmanship ability).142 In an effort to convince Charles and George to
consent to the operation, Dr. McGee misrepresents his ability to undertake
a skin-grafting operation,'43 and further misrepresents that he performed
such operations on German soldiers during the war.'" Dr. McGee, in an
effort to obtain Charles's and George's consent, exploits George's insecurity
about his hand by emphasizing the social problems it will cause him in
the future. 4 He also promises George that the surgery will result in "a
hundred per cent perfect hand or a hundred per cent good hand;"' that he
136 See id. ("During this period, the family physician, Edward McGee, while treating one
of George's younger brothers for pneumonia, also became aware of George's scarred hand.
Later, in 1919, after returning from several years of medical service in Europe during World
War I, McGee requested George and his parents to let him operate on the hand in order to
restore it to'perfect' condition.").
137 See Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641,643 (N.H. 1929) ("[Tlhe theory was advanced by
plaintiff's counsel in cross-examination of defendant that he sought an opportunity to'experi-
ment on skin grafting' ...... "); U.S. Fid. & Guar, 53 F.2d at 954 (quoting the plaintiff's allega-
tion in the complaint that Dr. McGee "experimented upon said plaintiff ");'ThE PAPER CHASE
BooK, supra note 2, at 7 (portraying the facts as involving Dr. McGee wanting to "experiment
in skin grafting"); ThE PAPER CHASE MOVIE, supra note 131 (same); The Paper Chase Television
Series, supra note 132 (same).
138 See Roberts, supra note 129, at 7 ("McGee encouraged the Hawkinses to allow him
to operate on the hand for three years . . . ."); Hawkins, 146 A. at 643 ("There was evidence
that the defendant repeatedly solicited from the plaintiff's father the opportunity to perform
this operation, and the theory was advanced by plaintiff's counsel in cross-examination of
defendant that he sought an opportunity to 'experiment on skin grafting,' in which he had
had little previous experience.").
139 Roberts, supra note 129, at 7 (quoting Howard Hawkins, one of George's younger
brothers) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Id.
141 U.S. Fid. & Guar, 53 F.2d at 954 (quoting the plaintiff's complaint describing the
condition of the hand prior to the operation).
142 Roberts, supra note 129, at 13.
143 U.S. Fid. & Guar, 53 F.2d at 954 (quoting the plaintiff's allegation in the complaint
that "the defendant did not possess the skill that he held himself out to possess").
t44 Roberts, supra note 129, at 7.
145 See id. ("[Dorothy] St. Hilaire (George's younger sister) recollects that McGee, in
persuading George to undergo the surgery, emphasized the social problems which his scarred
hand might create." (internal parenthetical added)).
146 Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("The only substantial basis for the plaintiff's claim is the testimony that the defendant also
said before the operation was decided upon,'I will guarantee to make the hand a hundred per
cent perfect hand' or a 'hundred per cent good hand."').
[Vol. 99350
CONTRACTUAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS
will be left only with "a small scar, [that] would hardly be noticeable after
healing;"'4" and that he would not be in the hospital for more than four days
and that a few days thereafter he could return to work.1'
Despite George's parents' doubts, as a result of Dr. McGee's pressure,
George consents to the operation upon turning eighteen.149 Dr. McGee,
having misrepresented his experience with skin-grafting operations,
botches the surgeryso (including using skin from George's chest"s' instead
of his thigh as he had originally represented he would do),'s leaving
George's hand "permanently disfigured and crippled."s 3 As a result of the
operation, the hand is left partially curled-up, it is filled with "dense matted
hair,"1 4 it "continue[s] to bleed ... throughout his life,"' and it is rendered
"useless."' 6 Although "'George was very bright,""5 s his embarrassment of
his hand causes him to never return to high school,' and his "crippled
hand affected his employment and outlook throughout his lifetime."5 9
B. Another Side of the Story
But there must be another side to this story. We know that the first
147 U.S. Fid. & Guar, 53 F2d at 954 (quoting the plaintiff's allegation in the complaint).
148 Hawkins, 146 A. at 642.
149 U.S. Fid. & Guar, 53 E2d at 954 (quoting the plaintiff's allegation in the complaint
that he relied upon Dr. McGee's promises in consenting to the operation and would not have
otherwise consented to the operation); Roberts, supra note 129, at 7 ("George agreed shortly
after his i8th birthday. St. Hilaire remembers that, while her parents had strong doubts about
the operation, they trusted McGee's judgment and were hesitant to oppose George's decision
and the physician's advice.").
150 Professor Frost states that the case portrays Dr. McGee as "the incompetent sur-
geon." Frost, supra note 8, at 1363.
151 Hawkins, 146 A. at 642 (noting that the skin for the graft was taken from George's
chest).
152 Roberts, supra note 129, at 7 ("McGee had earlier stated that the skin for the graft
was to come from George's thigh....").
153 Id. at i.
154 THE PAPER CHASE BOOK, supra note 2, at 7; see also U.S. Fid. & Guar., 53 Fzd at 954
(quoting the complaint's allegation that the skin grafted to George's hand "became matted,
unsightly, and so healed and attached to said hand as to practically fill the hand with an un-
sightly growth"); Roberts, supra note 129, at 7 ("[T]he post-operation scar covered his thumb
and two fingers and was densely covered with hair.").
155 Roberts, supra note 129, at 7.
156 U.S. Fid. & Guar., 53 F2d at 954 (quoting the complaint's allegation that the skin
grafted to George's hand "restrict[ed] the motion of the plaintiff's hand so that said hand has
become useless to the plaintiff").
157 Roberts, supra note 129, at 13 (quoting Howard J. Hawkins, George's brother).
i58 Id.
159 Id.
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trial resulted in a hung jury.16o Also, in the second trial, the judge (Judge
Scammon) ordered a nonsuit on the negligence claim against Dr. McGee.' 61
The jury in the second trial, although returning a verdict in George's favor
on the assumpsit claim, did not award a particularly large sum of money
($3,000).16 The court found that even this amount was "excessive, and ...
order[ed] that the verdict be set aside unless [George agreed] to remit all
in excess of $500." 161 We know that despite the New Hampshire Supreme
Court ruling that the trial judge's jury instruction on damages erroneously
precluded George from receiving expectation damages,'" George settled
the case for only $1,400.16' After the trial Dr. McGee's practice apparently
grew,'" and he was elected mayor of Berlin, New Hampshire, 16  hardly
things that could have occurred had the community believed he was
an incompetent surgeon who had pressured a teenager to consent to an
operation simply because he wanted to experiment with skin grafting. We
also know that the New Hampshire Supreme Court recited the facts.in the
light most favorable to George;'" that the First Circuit relied significantly
on the allegations in George's state-court complaint;169 and that Jorie
Roberts's article was based primarily on interviews and correspondence
with George's relatives, whose information was premised on oral history
favorable to George and was provided long after the events at issue.7 0
16o See U.S. Fid. & Guar, 53 F.2d at 954 ("At the first trial, the jury disagreed.").
161 Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 642 (N.H. 1929) ("The writ also contained a count
in negligence upon which a nonsuit was ordered, without exception."); see also U.S. Fid. &
Guar., 53 F.2d at 954 ("[TIhe court directed a verdict for defendant on the [negligence] count
162 U.S. Fid. & Guar., 53 F.2d at 955; Roberts, supra note 129, at 7 ("The jury only
awarded the Hawkins [sic] $3,000 for damages .....
163 See Hawkins, 146 A. at 641.
164 Id. at 644. ("We, therefore, conclude that the true measure of the plaintiff's damage
in the present case is the difference between the value to him of a perfect hand or a good
hand, such as the jury found the defendant promised him, and the value of his hand in its
present condition, including any incidental consequences fairly within the contemplation of
the parties when they made their contract." (citation omitted)).
165 U.S. Fid. & Guar., 53 Ezd at 955. Roberts states that the settlement also included
George's attorney's fees. Roberts, supra note 129, at 7 ("[Tlhe final settlement was for $1,400
and lawyers fees.").
166 Roberts, supra note 129, at 13.
167 Id.
168 See Hawkins, 146 A. at 641-44.
169 See U.S. Fid & Guar., 53 F.2d at 954-55.
170 See Roberts, supra note 129, at i ("[Tihe RECORD has delved into the human aspects
behind Hawkinsv. McGee through interviews and correspondence with George Hawkins' broth-
er and sister-in-law Howard J. and Edith Hawkins, his sister Dorothy Hawkins St. Hilaire,
and Berlin lawyer and [Harvard Law School] graduate Arthur J. Bergeron '32."). Roberts' 1978
article was published nearly 5o years after Hawkins v. McGee was heard by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court. Id.
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My review of the trial transcript shows that the popular understanding
of the events in Hawkins v. McGee is likely incorrect in several respects.
First, the evidence shows that George's hand was contracted (at least to
some extent) prior to the operation,"' and that the hand's pre-operation
condition possibly caused him some difficulty (though likely not significant
difficulty)."' Second, the evidence shows that Charles Hawkins broached
the subject of George's hand with Dr. McGee;"' Dr. McGee initially did not
want to perform the operation;1 74 and there was a much shorter time period
between this initial conversation and the operation than the three years
subsequently alleged by the Hawkins family.' This casts considerable
doubt on the theory that Dr. McGee relentlessly pursued George and his
father so that he could experiment with skin grafting. Third, the traditional
description of George's post-operation hand'7 6 fails to take into account
that the hand's contracted condition (the correction of which might have
been the operation's primary purpose) was likely improved. 77
These three facts ultimately lead to the conclusion that Dr. McGee
reasonably believed George wanted the operation primarily to correct his
hand's contracted state (not primarily for aesthetic purposes). Furthermore,
if he promised George a one hundred percent perfect or good hand, he
likely meant one hundred percent perfect or good only from the standpoint
of its contracted state.
1. The Burned Hand.-The popular conception is that George's pre-
operation scar was small and did not affect the use of his hand."' This
notion supports the conclusion that George and his father did not want the
operation, and that Dr. McGee pressured them to agree to the operation
(for three years), so that he could experiment with skin grafting (which he
had seen performed on German soldiers during World War I)."' But the
trial transcript and other evidence casts significant doubt on this popular
conception of the condition of George's hand prior to the operation.
a. A Stormy Night, a Shocking Morning (and a Lawsuit to Follow)
On March 1, 1914, when George was ten years old, 8 0 there was a bad
171 See discussion infra Part III.B.i.b.
172 See discussion infra Part III.B.i.c.
173 See infra text accompanying notes 302-17.
174 See infra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
175 See infra notes 302-03 and accompanying text.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 154-57.
177 See infra text accompanying notes 386-95.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
179 See supra Part III.A.
18o Transcript of Record at 2, 18, 30, 33, Hawkins v. McGee, No. 13724 (N.H. Super.
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storm in his hometown of Berlin, New Hampshire."' As a result of the
storm, two electrical wires (one of which came into the Hawkins's house)
were blown together and crossed, sending a strong current into the home.'
The next morning,"' Charles sent George downstairs to start a fire.'" When
George stood on a chair and reached up to turn on the electric light in
the kitchen over the stove, he was badly burned on his right hand by an
"electric spark."'"
George was treated by a doctor that morning. 186 The doctor dressed the
hand and told Charles that there was not any need for him (the doctor) to
come again, that he would send a nurse to dress the hand, and that nothing
more was necessary.' The nurse came to the house and initially dressed
the hand about every day and then every other day for two or three weeks,' 8
and it took three or four weeks for the burn to heal.' 9
Shortly after the incident, Charles, as father and next of friend of
George, brought suit against the Cascade Light & Power Co., the public
utility corporation in charge of the electrical wires.'" This is significant
because it suggests that the pre-operation injury was severe enough to
Ct. Dec. 1926) (on file with the New Hampshire Superior Court, Coos County, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, and the author), vacated, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). The evidence
of George's age at the time of the accident is conflicting, with the ages nine, ten, eleven, and
twelve years old having been reported. The writ filed in Hawkins v. Cascade Light & Power
Co. (the lawsuit filed at the time of the accident against the responsible party) stated that
George was twelve, though it also incorrectly stated that his left hand had been burned. Writ,
Hawkins v. Cascade Light & Power Co., (N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 1914) (on file with the New
Hampshire Superior Court, Coos County, and the author). Roberts states that it happened in
1915 when George was eleven. Roberts, supra note 129, at 7. Charles testified that George
was ten, though it was in response to a question from his lawyer that included the age of ten
in the question, Transcript of Record, supra, at 2, and it should be noted that Charles did not
seem sure of George's age at the time of the trial. See id. ("He is about twenty-two." (emphasis
added)). George testified that he was "[a]bout ten years old," and "[bjetween nine and ten."
Id. at 33. George's attorney later stated George was nine years old at the time of the accident.
Id. at 127 (attorney Coulombe stating "he was about nine years old"). We know that the ac-
cident occurred on March 2, 1914, from the writ filed in Hawkins v. Cascade Light &Power Co.
Writ, supra; see also Transcript of Record, supra, at 137. If George was born in January 1904,
Roberts, supra note 129, at i ("George Hawkins was born in January, 1904"), he was ten years
old at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the best evidence supports the conclusion that
George was ten years old at the time of the accident.
181 Transcript of Record, supra note i8o, at 2, 100.
182 Id. at 2-3, 17.
183 Id. at oo; Writ, supra note 18o.
184 Transcript of Record, supra note i8o, at ioo.
185 Id. at 2, 17-18, 33, 100, 120 (right hand).
186 Id. at 3, 29.
187 Id. at 29-30.
188 Id. at 30.
189 Id. at 3, 30, 33, 49-
190 Id. at 19; Writ, supra note i8o.
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have warranted a lawsuit. Also, the Hawkins family members reported that
Charles took George to skin specialists in Montreal after the accident (who
advised against taking any action to restore the hand),19' suggesting that
Charles considered the injury to be severe. In fact, an expert called by
Dr. McGee testified that George's burn would have been a third-degree
burn,'92 and Dr. Homer M. Marks, who assisted with the first operation,'93
agreed that it was a third-degree burn.'94 Additionally, as discussed below,
as time went by, the hand's condition likely worsened as a result of the
burn.
b. The Burned and Contracting Hand
The testimony in Hawkins v. McGee includes extensive testimony
regarding the condition of George's hand prior to the operation by Dr.
McGee. As shown by a summary of the testimony below, there is no dispute
that the burn caused his hand to start to contract prior to the operation.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that Dr. McGee's operation was the cause of
George's hand being contracted.
The burn left a scar that ran across the palm of George's right hand.'95
George, Charles, and Rose (George's mother) described it as a scar that "ran
across the palm" of his hand from the bottom of a finger to the bottom of
the thumb, and that it was raised like a ridge about the size of "half a lead
pencil."'9 Dr. Leith, an expert called by Dr. McGee, who only inspected
the hand after the operation,197 testified that in its pre-operative state the
"scar not only extended from the base of the second finger to the base of the
thumb, it also extended in another direction, at an angle across the palm."' 98
George testified that the scar was perhaps a little darker than ordinary skin
color,'" whereas Charles and Rose testified that it was dark.2" George and
Rose testified that it was not an "awfully bad looking hand" and was not
"repulsive" looking.z0' Ethel Oldham, who appears to have been a friend of
the Hawkins family,202 described it as a small scar across his hand, 203 "about
191 Roberts, supra note 129, at 7.
192 Transcript of Record, supra note I8o, at 92,94.
193 Id. at II9-20.
194 Id. at 125.
195 Id. at 3,50.
196 Id. at 3, I8, 28, 30-31,34.
197 Id. at 91.
198 Id. at 92.
199 Id. at 34.
200 Id. at 3, 31.
20I Id. at 33, 50.
202 She went with Rose to visit George in the hospital after the operation. Id. at 6o.
203 Id. at 59.
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the size of half a lead pencil,"" running from the bottom of a finger to the
bottom of his thumb"os and darker than his natural skin color.zos
Dr. McGee testified that it was a "deep injury down into the deeper
structures, destroying the palmar fascia," 0 going down to the ligaments
covering the bone,2 0s and that the resulting scar was "much larger than the
size of a pencil."2 0 Dr. Marks testified that the palm of George's hand was
essentially all scar tissue, "about the size of a dollar."210
With respect to whether the hand was contracted prior to the operation,
George and Charles admitted that a finger was "drawn in,"2 " and Charles
acknowledged that the hand was drawn in slightly.2 12 George testified that
the hand was contracted possibly at an angle of five degrees, with the thumb
pulled in "possibly a quarter or half an inch" toward his palm. 13 Harold
C. Sullivan, who appeared to be a friend of George's and who knew him
since George was twelve or fourteen,2 " described the injury as a "cord that
had been burned and contracted," and "[it seemed to cup the hand.""'
William E. Sawyer, who knew George prior to 1922, testified that the hand
had a "contraction,"2"6 and that a finger and the thumb were somewhat
drawn in together."'
Dr. McGee testified that when he saw the hand in 1921, it was
"contracted and deformed.""' Alberta W. Wight, a neighbor who was called
by Dr. McGee at trial, testified that she inspected George's hand before the
operation, and that it was "decidedly" repulsive and had the appearance of
a "dwarfed hand."" She testified that
[ilt seemed to be greatly drawn together from the sides, giving it a very
narrow appearance, and there was a finger ... which was drawn in a great
deal. Now the thumb was drawn in also; there was a ridge across his hand
across the palm, but it had the appearance of the palm being largely gone,-
204 Id. at 61-62.
205 Id.
2o6 Id. at 62.
207 Id. at 88.
2o8 Id.
209 Id. at 79.
210 Id. at 127.
21I Id. at 4,18, 27,34.
212 See id. at 18-19.
213 Id. at50.
214 Id. at 64.
215 Id. at 65-
216 Id. at 66.
217 Id. at67.
218 Id. at 69.
219 Id. at 1o.
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as though it had been burned out.zo
At the first trial, Wight testified that she had seen his hand out of her
window when he would walk along the street in front of her house and
that he appeared to have a "withered hand."221 Elizabeth B. Stewart,
one of George's schoolteachers from 1916 to 1919, testified that he had a
"deformed hand."m22
Edward James Halloran, foreman at the mill where George worked, 23
testified that the hand was "slightly cupped" and was "pretty well
contracted."224 Dr. Leith testified that "th[e] middle finger, ring finger, was
drawn in," that the "thumb was drawn in," and that the palm was "cupped"
or "contracted."225
Dr. McGee testified that as George grew older, his hand contracted as
a result of the scar not growing along with the hand.226 Dr. Leith similarly
testified that the hand would contract as it grew, pulling in the "parts at
either end of the scar." 2 Dr. Marks testified as well that the burn would
have drawn George's hand together as he grew older.2 8 He testified that
the second finger and the thumb were drawn inward as a result of the
heavy strong cord of fibrous [scar] tissue . . . almost as though a piece of
rope was stretched under the skin, pulling it up like the ridgepole of a tent,
and from this cord extending in either direction toward the outer side of
the hand and toward the center was quite a large area of scar tissue. That
scar tissue had caused contraction there so that the palm of the hand was
cupped; the thumb drawn in, the second finger drawn in ....
29
John M. Dresser, an officer and surgeon in the State Guard, testified that
George showed him his hand and the "fingers were contracted."2 1
The testimony of Dr. McGee and Dr. Marks regarding the purpose of
the operation, and the operation procedure itself, supports the conclusion
that George's hand was contracted prior to the operation. Dr. McGee,
when explaining the procedure used on George, testified that if doctors
simply removed the scar tissue without grafting any skin on it, the result
would have been a worse scar than the one already there, and with more
220 Id.
221 Id. at 102.
222 Id. at io8.
223 Id. at io8-o9.
224 Id. at 109.
225 Id. at 92.
226 Id. at 69.
227 Id. at 92.
228 Id. at 120.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 138.
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contractions. 31 Dr. Marks testified that
the purpose of this operation was to remove the scar tissue, and to release
the contractions, and to break up the adhesions in the hand, to restore it so
far as possible to its normal function, with the idea in view of later covering
in the denuded area with some sort of a skin graft.232
With respect to the operation procedure, Dr. McGee testified that after
cutting out the scar and the affected tissue 33 he tried to straighten out
the hand, but because of the length of time it had been contracted, it was
difficult to do, and he could not get the hand as straight as he would have
liked.23 Dr. McGee then put the hand "into a sort of padded splint" to
hold it in a straightened position for about a week, because without the
hand would have returned to its pre-operation contracted condition.3 Dr.
Marks confirmed that the hand was "dressed and put . .. in splints" after
the operation to maintain the position they had achieved.2 6
Dr. Marks testified that he and Dr. McGee "worked on the hand a
long time until all the scar tissues that appeared on the surface so far as
we could see, was removed, and until this right hand,-until this second
finger was so far freed that it assumed pretty nearly its normal position and
motion."" He testified that it was impossible to free the thumb to obtain
full motion, but that it was improved by fifty percent or more.3 Dr. Marks
testified that after the scar tissue was dissected as much as possible, they
attempted by "stretching and manipulati[on]" to "break up what adhesions
were left too deep" and to "flatten out the palm and restore it, so far as
possible, to its normal position." 39 He testified that if a second operation
involving the skin graft was not performed, new scar tissue would have
formed and the contractions and adhesions that had existed before would
have returned."
The testimony summarized above shows that George's hand was
contracted prior to the operation, at least to some extent. This casts doubt
on the assumption that Dr. McGee's operation caused George's hand
to contract. Rather, evidence supports the conclusion that one of the
operation's purposes (and perhaps its primary purpose) was to relieve the
hand of its contraction.
231 Id. at 70.
232 Id. at 120.
233 Id. at 79.
234 Id. at 71-72.
235 Id. at 72.
236 Id. at 121.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 121-22.
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c. A Burned, Contracted, and Useful Hand?
Not surprisingly, George testified that his right hand, after the burn,
was "just as useful" as it had been before the burn, that it did not have
any tenderness or pain, and that it never bothered him or interfered with
work or play.241 Charles testified that George never complained about the
hand,2 42 and that as far as use, it was a good hand.2 43 George testified that he
enjoyed camping, and during one such trip was apparently photographed
carrying two pails of water, which he did without difficulty.2" Rose testified
that the injury did not affect George; rather, "[h]e played ball, and he was
a good rifle shot; he skiied [sic] . . .could pitch and paint and cut wood."2 45
She testified that he played around with the other boys, and she never
heard him say that he could not do something the other boys could.246 She
also testified that she never heard him complain about the hand.247
George testified that he skied and performed all kinds of sports, and
was also proficient in shooting with his right hand." Harold Sullivan had
been out shooting with him two or three times, and testified that George
was a "very good" shot with a pistol.2 49 Sullivan also saw him on skis,so and
testified that he did not see him having any difficulty. 51 William E. Sawyer,
who served with George in the New Hampshire State Guard, testified that
he had been in the woods shooting with him, and George was a "very good
shot." 52 He also testified that he never noticed George having any difficulty
using his right hand and never heard him complain about it. 53
One of the bases for believing that George's pre-operation scar was
not a significant impairment was the fact that he reputedly "won several
medals as a marksman for the State Home Guard."254 This assertion by the
Hawkins family after George's death is not supported by the trial transcript,
and if it were true, it would surely have been revealed during the direct
examination of George. It is true, however, that he was a member of the
241 Id. at 34,49-50.
242 Id. at 3.
243 Id. at 27.
244 Id. at 42.
245 Id. at 31.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 33.
248 Id. at 41.
249 Id. at 64-65.
250 Id. at 64.
251 Id. at 65.
252 Id. at 66.
253 Id.
254 Roberts, supra note 129, at 13.
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New Hampshire State Guard,2"s an infantry unit that was formed during
World War 1.2s6 George testified that he was a member of the Guard for two
years,"' and Harlan J. Cordwell, who had been a captain in the Guard,5 '
confirmed that George had been a member of the company.zs9
Although there is no evidence in the trial transcript that George won
medals for his shooting, the mere fact that George was a member of the
Guard suggests that his injured hand was not significantly debilitating. To
become a member of the Guard, George was required to pass a physical
examination, and he testified that he was examined by Dr. Tappan Pulsifer
and passed one hundred percent.260 John Dresser, an officer and surgeon in
the Guard, recalled having a conversation with Dr. Pulsifer about passing
George, and they understood he was a good shot. 6 '
As a member of the Guard, George drilled with a rifle, and handled
the rifle with his right hand. 6 z George testified that he had no difficulty
drilling. 61 Captain Cordwell similarly testified that George did not have
any difficulty handling his gun or drilling.2 * William E. Sawyer, who was a
member of the Guard with George, likewise testified that he never noticed
George having any difficulty drilling.26 s George was ranked as a marksman,
and when an eight-person rifle team was assembled to compete in Concord,
New Hampshire, for a shooting competition, George was selected" because
he had one of the "best shots."267 This is the likely source of the Hawkins
family's assertion that George won medals for his shooting.
John Dresser testified, however, that he noticed that George "held his
rifle clumsily" and told him so and demonstrated to him how it was to
be held. George told him that he could not hold the rifle in that position
because "of a slight deformity of his hand." 68 Dresser testified, though,
that George was still considered a "very good shot." 69
Accordingly, the evidence regarding George's service in the Guard
255 Transcript of Record, supra note i8o, at 41.
256 Id. at 56, 66. His attorney suggested that he enlisted on December 22, 1919. Id. at
57.
257 Id. at 41.
258 Id. at 55-56.
259 Id. at 56.
26o Id. at 41, 133.
26I Id. at 138-39.
262 Id. at 41.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 56.
265 Id. at 66.
266 Id. at41, 56.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 137-38.
269 Id. at 138.
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does not support the Hawkins family's assertion that he was such a good
marksman that he won medals, but it does support a conclusion that his
hand was not sufficiently impaired that it precluded him from passing the
required physical or from being a good shot. Dresser's testimony suggests
that George's hand required him to hold the rifle in a position other than
normal, but this did not affect his shooting ability.
George's work history suggests that although his hand did not cause
him problems with shooting, it might have caused him problems in other
ways. When George was sixteen or seventeen he left school, and around
the age of seventeen. he went to work.270 For brief periods in 1918 and
1920, George worked at the Brown Company Sulfite Mill"' as a "common
laborer." 7 z He also worked at the Cascade Mills around 1921 or 1922,73 and
he was working there at the time of the surgery."'
George testified that the work required the use of both hands, and that
he did not have any trouble doing the job.275 A coworker similarly testified
that George did not have any trouble doing his job.16 William E. Sawyer,
who worked with George at the Cascade Mills, never noticed him having
any difficulty with the job.277 At the time of the operation, Michael Moffett,
the person to whom George's supervisor (Edward Halloran) reported,"2
testified that he did not recall Halloran complaining to him about McGee's
work.7 9
Halloran, however, testified that George would often drop sheets of
pulp, and when he asked him what was wrong (because Halloran had also
been receiving complaints from superiors), George responded, "I have got
a bum hand." 2s0 Halloran testified that George's work was unsatisfactory,
and he shifted him to a different position (wrapping), but his wrapping
was "unsatisfactory" too, and Halloran received complaints.2 1 1 When he
spoke with George, George allegedly told him that "he was doing the best
he could; that he wanted to get money enough to have an operation, and
[Halloran] told him ... 'go ahead ... and I will do what I can."' 8 2 Halloran
later testified that he told him, "'I will do everything I can by you, go ahead
270 Id. at 3, 34.
271 Id. at 117-18.
272 Id. at 3, 19, 34-35.
273 Id. at 3, 34, io8.
274 Id. at 31.
275 Id. at 34.
276 Id. at 135.
277 Id. at 67.
278 Id. at 43, 133.
279 Id. at 134.
280 Id. at lo8-9 (internal quotation marks omitted), 114.
281 Id. at 109,113.
282 Id. at 1o9.
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and do anything that you can, and I will get you through."'2 " Although
George testified that he had no trouble with this work, ** he confirmed
that he had a talk with Halloran during which Halloran agreed to let him
continue working despite his unsatisfactory performance. 8 This suggests
that George did, in fact, have some trouble working as a result of his hand.
Elizabeth B. Stewart, one of George's schoolteachers from 1916 to 1919,
taught George typewriting, among other subjects." She testified that his
hand caused him to type in an unusual manor, by pushing from the wrist
instead of from the knuckles,"' which made typing difficult and caused
him to fail the state typing test (which he later passed).8 8 When she tried to
correct his mechanics, he said he could not type differently because of his
hand.8 9 She also testified that he held his pen and pencil in an unordinary
way, and "there seemed to be a stiffness in his fingers," though his writing
was fair or good considering he had a "deformed hand."2"
Dr. Marks testified that the pre-operation contraction of the hand would
have affected its usefulness." Dr. Leith testified that George had also lost
the use of the end of his thumb, which he believed was the result of a
"deficient nerve supply" caused by the burn.292
Thus, the contracted condition of George's hand prior to the operation
reportedly caused him some difficulties, though these difficulties do not
appear to have been significant. If, however, George was still growing at
the time of the operation, his hand was likely continuing to contract, and
the contracting condition might have started to cause him greater problems
than it had in the past."
d. The Burned, Contracted, and Fairly Useful Hand
In conclusion, the trial testimony (and other evidence), viewed as a
whole, suggests that George's burn was significant enough in 1914 to cause
his father to file a lawsuit against the Cascade Light & Power Co. The burn
caused George's right hand to contract somewhat as he grew older, and
the injury likely caused him to have difficulty performing certain tasks at
times. Although the extent of the difficulties do not appear to have been
283 Id. at 115.
284 Id. at 35.
285 Id. at 136.
286 Id. at 105.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 1o5-o6.
289 Id. at io6.
290 Id. at io6-o8.
291 Id. at 121.
292 Id. at 93.
293 See supra noteS 227-23I and accompanying text.
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significant, they might well have increased as George grew older.
2. An Experiment?-The traditional story is that Dr. McGee learned
of George's burn prior to World War I, and after returning from the war
requested permission to operate on the hand so that he could experiment
with skin grafting. To convince Charles and George, he told them that he
had performed skin grafts on soldiers in Germany during the war, though
he later admitted this was untrue. For three years he encouraged them to
permit him to operate, emphasizing the social problems the hand would
cause George and promising to give him a one hundred percent perfect or
good hand. Finally, when George turned eighteen, he consented.
But, the fact that George's hand was contracted somewhat prior to the
operation, and the fact that it likely caused him some difficulties, suggests
that George and his father may have been interested in having the operation
performed. If this is true, the traditional view that Dr. McGee had to use years
of pressure as well as misrepresentations to convince Charles and George
to have the operation is inaccurate. In fact, as discussed below, a review of
the trial testimony provides no support for the conclusion that Dr. McGee
pursued Charles and George for three years, making misrepresentations
and promises so that he could experiment with skin grafting.
Dr. McGee graduated from the University of Vermont Medical College
in 1904,A opened a practice as a physician and surgeon in Berlin, New
Hampshire, that same year (he would have been around twenty-six),2 95 and
became the Hawkins's family doctor around 1914.% He served as a surgeon
and a first lieutenant in the United States Medical Service during World War
I and was stationed at the Base Hospital at Camp Merritt, New Jersey.2 97
He returned from the service in 1919.z9s He had seen some skin grafting
done at the hospital during the war and had even done some himself, but
"[n]ot a great deal.""
There is no evidence in the trial testimony that Dr. McGee learned of
George's scar before Dr. McGee served in World War I. Also, the Hawkins
family members' assertion that Dr. McGee told George and Charles that he
had grafted skin on German soldiers in Germany during the war, and then
recanted, has no support in the record.3 * Rather, Dr. McGee was stationed
in New Jersey during the war, and testified (without impeachment)
that he had performed some skin grafting (though not to the level of
294 Transcript of Record, supra note i8o, at 67.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 17,30.
297 Id. at 68.
298 Id. at 82.
299 Id.
3oo Roberts, supra note 129, at 7.
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complexity required for George's operation).30 ' Had Dr. McGee made
such a misrepresentation (regarding performing skin grafting on German
soldiers), George's lawyer surely would have asked George, Charles, and
Dr. McGee about this claim.
Additionally, there is no support in the trial testimony for the assertion
that Dr. McGee encouraged Charles and George to have the operation for
three years. Rather, Charles took George to see Dr. McGee in August or
September 1921,302 and the operation likely took place in January 1922.303
Accordingly, the assertion that there was a multi-year campaign of pressure
by Dr. McGee is incorrect.
What was said during that meeting in August or September 1921 was
disputed at trial. Although Charles denied wanting to have an operation
done at that time, " he admitted that without any suggestion from Dr.
McGee, he asked Dr. McGee to look at George's hand and to provide
an opinion as to what Dr. McGee could do in regard to an operation to
take off the scar.3 0s Charles testified that he was only seeking information
for the future so that he would be educated when he was ready to have
the operation performed.3 * He admitted, however, that he anticipated
having the operation done at some time.o' On cross-examination, Charles
contradicted this harmful testimony, stating that he did not have any
intention of having the operation done at all because George was "working
every day ... earning pretty good money," and there was no real need for an
operation. 0 George testified that he did not intend to have the operation
done at that time.3 0 What is undisputed, however, is that Charles (not Dr.
McGee) broached the subject of an operation to correct George's hand.
At that meeting, Dr. McGee looked at George's hand. 31 0 Charles and
George testified that Dr. McGee examined it and responded that it was
"a simple operation [that] could be done very easily," but that he was not
undertaking any surgical work at that time, and that Charles should take
George to see Dr. Tappan Pulsifer and he would do the job.3 " (Dr. McGee
301 Id. at 82.
302 Id. at 35,45, 68, 70, 8o. Charles testified that he was seeing Dr. McGee around 1922,
and that he took George to see the doctor about his hand. Id. at 4.
303 Id. at 10, 29,36.
304 Id. at i i.
305 Id. at 4, 11, 15, 68, 70, 8o. George testified that Charles never suggested an operation
to Dr. McGee, id. at 45, but that testimony cannot be believed considering Charles admitted
broaching the subject with Dr. McGee. Id. at 4, 11, 15.
3o6 Id. at i i.
307 Id.
3o8 Id. at 13.
309 Id. at 5 i.
310 Id. at68.
311 Id. at I1,35,46-47,51-
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denied ever having given up surgery for a period of time."') Charles
testified that he responded that he did not want the job done now; he just
wanted to find out what could be done (which seemingly contradicted his
testimony that he was not interested in having it done at all)."' Charles
testified that Dr. McGee replied that he would like him to see Dr. Pulsifer
to look at the hand anyway. 3 14
Dr. McGee testified that Charles told him that George's hand was
bothering him at work and with hunting or shooting, that it was "getting
worse all the time," and that he would like to have it operated on to have
the scar removed." This was supported by testimony from Edward James
Halloran, George's foreman at the mill.1 6 As previously noted, Halloran
testified that when he complained to George about his work performance,
George said that he was "doing the best he could," and that he wanted to
earn money to have an operation." This is also consistent with Charles's
admission that he broached the subject of the hand with Dr. McGee, and
is further consistent with the medical testimony that George's hand would
have been contracting as he grew older.
Dr. McGee asserted that he told Charles that a skin graft could be
performed on George, and explained to him the procedure, including the
fact that sometimes the graft does not heal.1 Dr. McGee testified that
he had never performed an operation exactly like this before," and he
admitted on cross-examination that he would like to learn32 0 and was
naturally interested in such an operation.32 ' He testified that he told them
he could do the operation, but that they should go to Boston or New York
to see someone who performed such procedures. 3 2 He also denied telling
them it was a simple operation.3 3 He testified that he did not want to
perform the operation because such operations require significant attention
and several operations324 and because the results of such an operation are
uncertain.3 5 Dr. McGee denied telling them at that meeting to see Dr.
312 Id. at So.
313 Id. at 4, ii.
314 Id. at 4,II, 13.
315 Id. at 87.
316 See id. at io9.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 70-71.
319 Id. at 82,90.
320 Id. at 82.
321 Id. at 9o.
322 Id. at 70,80.
323 Id. at So.
324 Id. at 70.
325 Id. at 81.
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Pulsifer.3 16
While the jury apparently believed that Dr. McGee had promised
George a one hundred percent perfect or good hand, the evidence does
not reveal a doctor obsessed with experimenting with skin grafting and
misrepresenting his qualifications to encourage Charles and George to
consent to the operation. To the contrary, Charles broached the subject
of an operation to correct George's handm3 which suggests that the hand
bothered George, either physically or aesthetically, more than he admitted
during trial. The fact that Dr. McGee recommended that George see a
different doctor (either Dr. Pulsifer or a doctor in New York or Boston,
depending on whose version is believed 1 8 ) further suggests that Dr. McGee
was not pursuing George so that he could experiment with skin grafting.
Although Dr. McGee might have solicited the work between August/
September 1921 and the operation in January 1922, perhaps even making
the operation seem easier than it was, and although he was intrigued by
the chance to perform the operation, the trial testimony does not comport
with the traditional description of Dr. McGee. The theory that Dr. McGee
wanted to experiment with skin grafting was simply a theory advanced
by George's lawyer in a question posed during trial to Dr. McGee.329 Also,
had there been substantial evidence that Dr. McGee simply wanted to
experiment with skin grafting, one would think that his reputation in Berlin
would have been damaged such that it would have been unlikely that he
could thereafter be elected mayor.
3. The Hairy Hand.-Several facts suggest that the condition of George's
right hand after the operation might not have been as bad as commonly
thought. For example, the description of the post-operation hand comes
from the writ filed by George in his lawsuit, and it is likely that George's
lawyer would have described the hand's condition in as grotesque a fashion
as possible. Also, we know that the jury did not award a particularly large
sum of money ($3,000), and the trial judge felt that any amount above
326 Id. at 8o-8i. Charles and George testified that they visited Dr. Pulsifer, a physician
and surgeon in Berlin who apparently had a busy practice. Id. at 15, 35,47. Charles asked him
what he could do in regard to removing the scar. Id. at 14. Charles and George testified that
Dr. Pulsifer told them that it was a very simple operation that could be done very easily. Id.
at 35, 47. Whenever Charles was ready to have the operation, he was to notify Dr. Pulsifer
and he would do it for him. Id. at 4, 10-1I, 14, 26,47. Dr. Pulsifer did not say anything about
guaranteeing the result of the operation. Id. at ii. Charles and Dr. Pulsifer did not discuss
the cost of the operation. Id. at 15. Charles did not report back to Dr. McGee about Pulsifer's
opinion. Id. at 14. George testified that he did not have any intention of having the operation.
Id. at 35-36.
327 Id. at 4.
328 Id. at 4, 70, 8o.
329 Id. at 82.
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$500 was excessive.o30 We also know that the trial judge ordered a nonsuit
on George's negligence claim,331 which means that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding that Dr. McGee had acted carelessly.3 2
It seems that the more damaged the hand after the operation, the more
difficult it would be to direct a nonsuit on the negligence claim.
The trial testimony indicates that the condition of George's hand might
not have been significantly different from what would be expected from
such an operation. 33 Yes, the hand did have hair on it,3M which George
surely did not expect (and Dr. McGee did not assert that he made George
aware of this risk). And it also had excessive skin.335 After surgery, grafted
skin shrinks so doctors must use enough skin to ensure the area from which
the skin tissue was removed remains covered.3 6 It is undisputed that the
grafted skin did not shrink enough to avoid leaving an excess.3 Thus,
there seems to be little doubt that aesthetically the hand was worse after
the operation than it had been before.
But this is only conclusive evidence that the operation was unsuccessful
and the hand was worse than before if the only goal of the operation was
to improve the hand's appearance. If one of the goals of the operation, and
perhaps the primary goal, was to relieve the hand of its contracted condition,
it is not so clear that the hand's condition worsened. To fully assess the
post-operation condition of the hand, an analysis of the operation and the
resulting condition of the hand is necessary.
Dr. McGee testified that the procedure included three operations. 338 He
testified that during the first operation, he cut off George's scar, which was
difficult to do because it was attached to tendons, and he cut out down "to
the healthy tissue as much as possible."33 Dr. Marks confirmed that during
the first operation the deep cord that ran across the palm was removed.3,
The second operation took place about a week after the first operation.Mu
Dr. Marks did not participate in the second operation;342 rather, Dr. Tappan
330 McGee v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 53 Fad 953, 955 (ist Cir. 1931); Hawkins v. McGee,
146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929).
331 Transcript of Record, supra note I8o, at I; U.S. Fid. &Guar, 53 F2d at 954; Hawkins,
146 A. at 644.
332 BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 596 (2d ed. 1995).
333 Transcript of Record, supra note I8o, at 78, 91.
334 Id. at 40.
335 Id. at 91.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 75.
339 Id. at 71.
340 Id. at 121.
341 Id. at 37.
342 Id. at 122.
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Pulsifer assisted. 3? The purpose of the second operation was to graft the
skin from George's chest onto his right hand where the scar tissue had been
removed.3" To make sure that the skin graft properly attached to George's
hand, it was necessary to attach the hand directly to the skin on his chest.34
Dr. McGee testified that the purpose of the third operation was to detach
the hand from the chest. 6 He testified that once the flap of skin attached
to the hand had been there long enough to establish new circulation, the
flap was then completely removed from the chest and fully attached to the
hand."4
It is undisputed that the post-operation hand had excessive skin on
it,m and interestingly, it was the excessive skin-not the hair-that was
the focus of the trial. Thus, although the hair on the hand was an issue,
the primary issue with respect to the so-called burned and hairy hand was
neither its burn (which admittedly had been removed) nor its hair (which
likely was not excessive; otherwise it would have been a more significant
issue at trial).
The excess skin was referred to at trial as a "bunch," and the bunch was
"largely skin and fat [with] some connective tissue in it, and ... a little scar
tissue."349 As demonstrated below, the primary issue with respect to the
bunch was whether it was a "big bunch" or a "little bunch."
Dr. McGee felt that the operation had an "exceptionally good result,"
despite the excess skin (and the hair).3 0 He testified that he felt the hand
did not look any worse than it did before the operation, except possibly for
the "little bunch" (as he described it).35 ' He stated that there was a place on
a finger that "bulge[d] out" that could not be attended to immediately, until
it was seen how much of the flap would shrink and before the nourishment
for the flap was established . 3 He asserted that although there was a little
too much skin on the hand after the operation, it is the practice to have
too much .3 3 It is preferable to have too much rather than too little because
there is always shrinkage after the operation.35 4 He testified that "there is
always more or less of a bunch [in the palm of the hand] where there is a
343 Id. at 130.
344 Id. at 122.
345 Id. at 123.
346 Id. at 75.
347 Id
348 Id. at 91.
349 Id. at 96.
350 Id. at 76.
351 Id. at 79.
352 Id. at 76.
353 Id. at 83.
354 Id
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graft."3"s He stated that he did not know "how much shrinkage there would
be" or "how long it would take."s3 6
Dr. McGee testified that he anticipated that it might be necessary to
have a further procedure to get the bunch reduced."' He stated that the
procedure involved making a slit and removing the surplus tissue, though
he admitted that there would still be a bunch of some kind and there would
still be hair."5 He testified, however, that after the operation with the slit, it
would look better than it had before.359 He also asserted that with an injury
as deep as George's, it would be impossible to have a graft that left the skin
smooth.36 He testified that he achieved the result he expected from the
operation, and that he anticipated that George would let him "finish the
job."
61
Dr. William H. Leith, a witness called by Dr. McGee, testified that
the result of the operation was "[a] good result so far as it has gone," and
that because the graft had not "shrunken as much as might be hoped or
anticipated," there remained some superfluous skin that needed to be
removed to complete the operation, and that it would not be a difficult
procedure. 362 The procedure Dr. Leith recommended was different from
the operation suggested by Dr. McGee, and if feasible, involved removing
a portion of the bunch to "flatten it."3 63 Dr. Leith testified that such an
operation would not require George to remain in the hospital, the hand
would heal in about ten days, and he could work with it several weeks
later.36 Dr. Leith also testified that it is customary to cut an over-size graft
because it will shrink during healing, but that one cannot know for sure how
much it will shrink. 6 He further testified that the hand looked healthy and
had a good blood supply.3 *
Dr. Marks, who had inspected the hand, testified that he did not recall
"any great lumps in the palm of his hand," and the only "lump" he recalled
that was noticeable was "one that exist[ed] at the base of the second finger,
where the stump of the flap was left."3 67 The lump existed because "[tihere
is naturally around the margin of the skin flap ... a rough edge there where
355 Id. at 88.
356 Id. at 84.
357 Id.
358 Id. at 78.
359 Id. at 79-80.
360 Id. at 88-89.
361 Id. at 78.
362 Id. at 91.
363 Id. at 96-98.
364 Id. at 98-99.
365 Id. at 91.
366 Id. at 99.
367 Id. at 122.
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that joins the normal skin of the hand," and "because [his] margin will
leave a slight ridge." 3 He testified that a "simple" operation was needed
to take out some of the fatty tissue at the base of one of the fingers to
make it smooth3 9 Dr. Pulsifer also testified that an additional operation
was needed to remove some of the fat and that it would be simple.37 0
In contrast to Dr. McGee's testimony regarding the post-operation
condition of the hand, George testified that when he saw his hand, he felt
it looked so bad he asked Dr. McGee to cut it off.37' Charles described the
excess skin as a "big bunch.""' George's attorney referred to it as "a bunch
of skin with hair growing on it" in the palm of the hand.373 George stated
that it had hair on it, "the same as the hair on [his] chest," and the hair
kept growing.7 4 Rose claimed that it looked "much worse" than before
the operation.3 5 George testified that there were also marks on the hand
where there had been stitches used to attach the hand to his chest.37 6 He
stated that these marks were noticeable after the operation, but that they
have "golnel down some" with time." William E. Sawyer asserted that the
hand looked "[flar worse" than it did before the operation.3 8 Dr. Pulsifer
confirmed that the hand had hair on it, but that it did not hurt him to have
hair on his palm.37 9 He also testified that skin is taken from wherever it is
easiest, and that the chest is a "common place" from which to get skin for a
graft.380
Charles testified that he asked Dr. McGee about the bunch, and McGee
told him that it was nothing, and it would heal and then "go down in time,"
perhaps in a year.38 1 George also testified that Dr. McGee told him that
"the bunch was going to work down to the same level as the rest of the
hand."382 Dr. McGee testified that he probably told George that it would
shrink some and to "come in and see [him] once in a while" so he could
"see how it was doing."8 3 George testified that the hand healed, but the
368 Id.
369 Id. at 124.
370 Id. at 131.
371 Id. at 38.
372 Id. at 7.
373 Id. at 88.
374 Id. at 4o.
375 Id. at 33-
376 Id. at 4o.
377 Id.
378 Id. at 67.
379 Id. at 132.
380 Id. at 133.
381 Id. at 7, 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
382 Id. at 39.
383 Id. at 85.
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bunch did not go down."* Charles similarly testified that the bunch never
went down."' He testified that Dr. McGee ultimately said he was "all done
with the hand" and there was "nothing more that he could do for it." 3 Dr.
McGee testified that he felt the bunch had reduced since the operation,
and had even reduced since the first trial in April.387
Interestingly, after the operation, George visited Edward Halloran one
evening at Halloran's house, which was the first time Halloran had seen him
since the operation.3 88 Halloran asked him how his hand was coming, and
George replied that it was doing "first rate" or that it was better.3 * Halloran
testified that George showed him his hand and said that Dr. McGee had
"done well."3" George told Halloran that he had to have another operation,
and that he had not gone back for it yet.91 George, however, denied telling
Halloran that he was going to have another operation.3 11
Thus, with respect to the appearance of George's hand after the
operation, it is undisputed that it had a "bunch" consisting of excess skin,
and that the bunch had hair on it. The size of the bunch was emphasized
by Charles and George and deemphasized by Dr. McGee. Of course, the
jury surely saw the hand (though the transcript does not indicate that the
jury inspected it). Based on the jury's award of only $3,000 (an amount the
Hawkins family later felt was small), the judge's decision that any amount
in excess of $500 was excessive, and George's subsequent agreement to
settle for only $1,400, it is likely that the "bunch" was not as grotesque,
either in terms of the amount of excess skin or the amount of hair on it, as
commonly thought. Although George's sister later stated that she believed
"the jurors, while at heart solidly behind the Hawkinses' cause, were afraid
to return heavier damages against McGee because he was one of the more
prominent physicians in the area," 93 the small verdict combined with the
judge's opinion and George's decision to settle for a small amount suggest
that a more reasonable explanation is that the hand's condition was not as
bad as commonly portrayed.
Concerning the contracted condition of George's hand, Dr. Leith
testified that after the operation George could extend all of his fingers
except one, which "lack[ed] about ten degrees of full extension, due to a
384 Id. at 40.
385 Id. at 12, 25.
386 Id. at 12, 21, 23, 26.
387 Id. at 84.
388 Id. at i i , 115.
389 Id. at 115-16.
390 Id. at i ii.
391 Id. at I I6.
392 Id. at 136.
393 Roberts, supra note 129, at 7.
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little contraction of the scar" still on the hand." He testified that George
could move all of his fingers and that "he [could] proximate the thumb to
each of the fingers all the way across, and [that] he ha[d] a good, firm grasp,
so that the mobility of the hand ha[d] been very much improved by the
operation."395 Dr. Pulsifer testified that George had "better tensions in his
hand" at the time of the second trial than he had when Pulsifer examined
him. 9 6 Importantly, George did not offer any evidence that his hand's
contracted condition had not been improved as a result of the operation.
Accordingly, to the extent Charles and George wanted the operation to
relieve the hand of its contracted condition, the operation was successful.
In regard to the usefulness of George's hand after the operation, the
testimony focused primarily on whether George's hand was more sensitive
after the operation, and it appears undisputed that it was. Dr. McGee
admitted that you could not expect the palm to be as tough as it was
originally because it is a different kind of tissue."9 Rose testified that for
activities that require a strong grip, George could only do them for a certain
length of time, perhaps an hour, or his hand would get "raw,"398 and that she
had seen it bleed "several times."3 9
George testified that after the operation he was not able to perform
the same work as he had before the operation without injuring his hand. 0
Mark T White, the loading foreman in the sulphite department at the
Brown Company Cascade Mill," corroborated this testimony, stating that
George's hand would prevent him from performing that type of work.40
William E. Sawyer also asserted that he did not think George's hand would
permit him to do the previous work he had done ."3 George testified that
the "skin would peal [sic] off and become raw ... a yellow matter [would]
run out of it," and it would take three or four days to heal.'
George testified that it was six months before he felt he could return
to work after the operation.4"' He stated that he returned to his old job but
in a promoted position in the weighing department. White testified that
394 Transcript of Record, supra note i8o, at 92.
395 Id. at 93-
396 Id. at 133.
397 Id. at 79.
398 Id. at 32-33.
399 Id. at 33.
400 Id. at 40.
401 Id. at 6z.
402 Id. at 63.
403 Id. at 67.
404 Id. at 40.
405 Id. at 43.
406 Id. at 43, 53, 134.
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he gave him the job because of his hand," and that the work was "clerical
[and] office work."" George asserted that at times he would help out his
foreman and do the work he did before, but that he could only do it for
ten or fifteen minutes before his hand became "sore and raw."' White
also testified that he asked George to help him out with some loading and
"it pulled th[e] surplus flesh down so that it ... tore it from the palm of
his hand." 410 White testified that George worked at the mill until around
November 1924411 and was terminated because he did not attend to his
work. The termination had nothing to do with his hand.4 12 George asserted
that he also had problems at a subsequent job, and his hand would become
raw and a "running matter" would come out of it, and it would take three
or four days to heal. 4 13
George testified that after the operation he was also unable to shoot a
revolver with his right hand because the bunch would prevent him from
getting a "grip on the revolver butt," and his index finger could barely
reach the trigger, preventing him from holding the gun steady.4 14 He was
also allegedly unable to handle a rifle as well as before the operation. 41 s
George also testified that he could probably not carry a heavy pail of water
with his right hand anymore, 4 16 and that he was unable to lay his right hand
flat against his knee. 4 17 He testified that his hand bothered him when skiing
and that he could not chop wood.418 He admitted that he drove a car, but
testified that it bothered him to shift because the bunch was in the way,
though he could steer with his left hand.4 19 Robert H. Reid testified that
he saw George on skis in January 1925, but he did not think George could
compete in an annual ski race due to his hand.420 William E. Sawyer stated
that he saw George cranking up a motor boat, and that it left George's hand
"bruised and bleeding" where the skin was grafted. 421
An encounter between George and Ms. Wight (the neighbor) after the
first trial, during which George showed Wight his hand, was a matter of
407 Id. at 63.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 53.
410 Id at 63.
411 Id. at 64.
412 Id.
413 Id. at 43-44.
414 Id. at 41, 53.
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420 Id. at i19.
421 Id. at 67.
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dispute. Around the last week in May or the first week in June 1922, George
passed Wight as he was walking along the sidewalk. 422 He greeted her and
"went perhaps [twenty-five] or [thirty] feet and stopped and looked back
at [her]," and asked if he could show her something.423 She agreed, and he
came back and told her that he wanted to show her his hand." He told her
that he had just bought a new car, and "there had been quite a bit of work
to do on this new car, and he had scratched his hand while he was working
on the car."425 Wight testified that the hand had "improved greatly" since
she examined it at the trial in April,4 26 and that it was "not bleeding."427 She
testified that "[h]e had one little scratch about a quarter of an inch long,"
and that she spoke of "putting something on it, and he said it didn't need
it, . .. it was nothing; it would heal up."4 2 George testified that this event
occurred, but that his "hand was raw in places, and [a] kind of matter [was]
running out of it," and it was bleeding as a result of working on his car
that morning.42 9 It seems likely that George's hand had suffered some harm
from the work on the car or else George would not have asked Wight to
look at it.
George testified that his hand was a source of embarrassment, in that
if he met someone for the first time and went to shake hands, the person
would want to know what was in his hand.43 0 It was especially embarrassing
to George when he met a woman. 431 The "fellows" would also make
jokes about his hand,432 and he never "had any trouble like that before
the operation." 433 The Hawkins family later stated that George's parents
encouraged him to return to school but he was too embarrassed, which
might well have been true.43 There was not, however, any testimony to this
effect, and George had apparently quit school and started working prior
to the operation.435 It is certainly possible, however, that if his hand was
excessively sensitive and prevented him from performing manual labor, his
parents may have encouraged him to return to school.
In conclusion, with respect to the hand's post-operation condition, its
422 Id. at ioi.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Id.
426 Id. at io2.
427 Id. at 103.
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appearance was surely worsened, and its sensitivity likely increased. But its
contracted state was likely improved.
C. The Real Story
An analysis of the trial testimony, combined with the other available
information, suggests that the following is a more accurate description of
the events surrounding Hawkins v. McGee than those commonly provided.
The burn suffered by George in 1914 was a third-degree burn, and so
serious that Charles filed suit against the responsible utility company and
took George to Montreal to determine if anything could be done to restore
the hand. The doctors in Montreal recommended against taking any action,
and over the years the fingers on George's hand drew inward because the
hand grew but the scar tissue did not. Although there is not substantial
evidence that the contracting nature of the hand caused George serious
problems, the hand was continuing to contract as he aged and was perhaps
causing him increasing difficulties. As a result, Charles inquired of Dr.
McGee as to whether anything could be done to correct the problem.
Charles and George, when speaking with Dr. McGee, probably
emphasized the contracted condition of the hand, and there was likely
little discussion about the hand's appearance (or improving it). Dr. McGee
told Charles and George that there were better persons to perform such
an operation than he, but a few months later they agreed that Dr. McGee
would perform the operation. Dr. McGee might have encouraged Charles
and George to have the operation, but it would have been over the course
of four or five months, not three years as was later alleged by the Hawkins
family.
Dr. McGee most likely did a poor job of warning Charles and George
about the seriousness of the operation; about having to use excess skin
that might not shrink to a perfect fit; about chest skin being more sensitive
than the skin originally on the hand; and about the possibility of having
hair on the grafted skin. (There is no evidence in the record, however, that
Dr. McGee told Charles and George that he was going to use skin from
George's thigh, as was later alleged by the Hawkins family.) Dr. McGee
might not have been as forthcoming as he should have been because he
was intrigued with the possibility of the operation, but he did not pursue
Charles and George so that he could experiment with skin grafting.
The operation was successful with respect to relieving the hand of its
contracted state. With respect to how the hand looked, it was surely worse
than before: George traded scar tissue for excess skin with hair. It was also
likely more sensitive than it had been before, which might have made it
difficult for him to engage in manual labor or other similar tasks. Thus, a
burned and contracted hand was replaced with a hairy and sensitive hand.
And, there is no testimony in the record indicating that Dr. McGee warned
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Charles and George that even if the operation was a success with respect to
relieving the hand of its contraction, it might look worse and be sensitive.
Thus, I suspect that Hawkinsv. McGee is not about an incompetent doctor
(remember, the trial judge ordered a nonsuit on the negligence claim) who
pursued a patient for years, saying whatever was necessary to convince the
patient to undergo an unnecessary and undesired surgery so that the doctor
could experiment with skin grafting. Rather, I suspect that it is a case of a
patient who wanted to fix a problem with his hand and a doctor who failed
to effectively communicate some significant side effects that might result.
Accordingly, the popular perception of the facts, gleaned from The Paper
Chase and Jorie Roberts's interview with Hawkins family members, is likely
wrong.
Rather, the case was probably about a misunderstanding. If Dr. McGee
promised George a one hundred percent perfect or good hand, George
likely thought Dr. McGee meant perfect in all respects, but Dr. McGee
likely meant perfect with respect to relieving the hand of its contracted
condition. Presumably a reasonable person would have interpreted Dr.
McGee's alleged promise to mean perfect in all respects, so under the
objective theory of contracts Dr. McGee would be liable for breach. But
we are still left to answer Professor Kingsfield's question to James Hart in
The Paper Chase: "[W]hat sort of damages do you think the doctor should
pay?"43 6 As discussed in Part I of this Article, I think he should pay the
difference between George's post-operation hand and what Dr. McGee
intended to promise him (or an amount based on George's reliance interest,
whichever is greater).
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that when there is a misunderstanding with
respect to what has been promised under a bargained-for exchange contract,
the remedy for breach should be based on what the promisor intended to
promise. An award based on the objective theory of contracts cannot be
justified on either deontological or consequential grounds and is therefore
unwarranted.
Under the exception to the general rule of damages this Article proposes
for cases involving contractual misunderstandings, the most famous case
involving expectation damages-Hawkins v. McGee-was wrongly decided.
George Hawkins should have been entitled only to the difference in value
between his hand prior to the operation and the post-operation condition of
the hand as Dr. McGee intended to promise. Accordingly, any negative side
effects of the operation (such as the hair and additional skin) should not have
been taken into account when measuring damages. If, however, the reliance
436 THE PAPER CHASE BOOK, supra note 2, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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interest would have provided for a greater recovery, Hawkins should have
been entitled to the difference between the condition of his hand before
the operation and the condition of his hand after the operation. 437 Although
McGee was likely to blame for the misunderstanding, the availability of
the award proposed by this Article will be sufficient incentive for promisors
to act carefully when using promissory language.
437 Thus, let us assume (as I think was true) that Dr. McGee intended his alleged refer-
ence to a one hundred percent perfect or good hand to relate solely to the hand's contracted
state, and let us assign a value of "io" to a hand with perfect flexibility. If George's hand
prior to the operation had a value of "6," and after the operation it had a value of "9," George
would be entitled to damages based on the difference between a hand with a flexibility of "9"
and a hand with a flexibility of "io." If, however, the difference in value between the post-
operation hand and the value of the promised hand based on an objective interpretation of
the promise (which would likely include its appearance and its sensitivity) was greater than
the difference between a hand with a "9" flexibility and a "io" flexibility, this larger amount
would be awarded.
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